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Congressional plenary power over Native Americans sits in direct conflict
with tribal sovereignty. Scholarship and case law justifying plenary power run
the gamut from finding an expansive preconstitutional federal plenary power
over Native Americans to narrowly reading the Indian Commerce Clause to
limit congressional power to trade alone. All claim historical legitimacy, but
none has been able to explain why the Indian Affairs Clause from the Articles of
Confederation failed to appear in the Constitution or, conversely, why the new federal government never limited itself to regulating Indian trade. The combination of
the unexplained textual shrinkage and disharmony between text and practice
seems to suggest that the Framers made a mistake in drafting the Constitution.
Based on archival and forensic research, this Article concludes that the
Constitution is missing an Indian Affairs Clause first by mistake, then by design.
The five-member Committee of Detail, tasked by the Constitutional Convention
with producing a working draft of the Constitution, seems to have accidentally
omitted an Indian Affairs Clause. Inclusion of a congressional power over Indian
trade and affairs was compelled by its long prehistory and a unanimous vote by
the Convention, and John Rutledge as Committee chair directed James Wilson to
include it in a marginal note. The evidence indicates that Wilson meant to comply with the command: not only was he personally motivated to comply, but he
placed a check mark next to the Clause. However, he simply failed to include the
power in his final draft. Thereafter, James Madison caught the mistake, and
the Committee of Detail deigned to address its lapse by importing “Indian
Tribes” into the Commerce Clause but refused to restore power over “Indian affairs,” converting an innocent mistake into a meaningful omission. None thereafter
seemed to notice the disappearance of the Indian affairs power, and the omission
has caused two centuries of confusion to the detriment of the tribes.
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This history raises serious questions for constitutional theory, federal Native
American policy, state-tribal relations, and Commerce Clause jurisprudence. This
Article addresses the implications of the missing clause for congressional plenary
power over tribes and suggests that the Constitution, written without an Indian
Affairs Clause, should be taken seriously. By its omission, the preconstitutional
Indian affairs power was split between the president and Congress under the
Constitution’s enumerated powers, with the residue flowing back to the tribes, not
the states. In the stead of congressional plenary power, this Article recommends the
reinitiation of tribal treaty-making as a fix for the missing clause. Re-treating with
tribes is consistent with the Constitution’s text, history, structure, and precedent.
The time is ripe for such a change: current events and the present moment of racial
awareness could provide the impetus for overturning one and a half centuries of
colonialism and restoring beleaguered tribal sovereignty.
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INTRODUCTION
Billy Jo Lara, a Turtle Mountain Native American, struck a
federal officer on the Spirit Lake Reservation. He was then tried,
in succession, before the Spirit Lake Tribal Court and the Federal
District Court for the District of North Dakota. Having already
served ninety days in prison for his tribal conviction, Lara
claimed double jeopardy before the federal tribunal, triggering

2021]

The Missing Indian Affairs Clause

415

two questions: (1) whether the tribal conviction was issued by a
separate sovereign (thus precluding the double jeopardy claim),
and (2) whether Congress had the power to adjust tribal sovereignty as it had in 1991, permitting one tribe (Spirit Lake) jurisdiction over a member of another tribe (Turtle Mountain). 1
Upon arrival at the Supreme Court, United States v. Lara 2
required the Court to address the largest controversy in Native
American law: the tension between tribal sovereignty and congressional plenary power over tribes. 3 Justice Stephen Breyer,
writing for the Court, summarily concluded that the tribes are
sovereign, resting on Congress’s acceptance of Chief Justice
John Marshall’s designation of the tribes as “domestic dependent
nations.” 4 Justice Breyer then turned to the more convoluted
history of congressional plenary power over tribes. He recognized that plenary power had traditionally derived from the
combined weight of the Indian Commerce Clause and the treaty
power. 5 In elaborating on the grants of both constitutional provisions, Justice Breyer rested on previous Court decisions in affirming that the “central function of the Indian Commerce
Clause . . . is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate
in the field of Indian affairs.” 6 The treaty power, on the other
hand, “does not literally authorize Congress to act legislatively,
for it is an Article II power authorizing the President, not
Congress, ‘to make Treaties.’” 7 However, “treaties made pursuant to that power can authorize Congress to deal with matters
with which otherwise Congress could not deal.” 8
Yet the treaty power was no longer doing the textual work
for Indian affairs: as Justice Breyer admitted, “in 1871 Congress
ended the practice of entering into treaties with the Indian

United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197–98 (2004).
541 U.S. 193 (2004).
3
Throughout this Article, I use “Native” and “tribe” to refer to indigenous U.S.
American peoples; I generally use “Indian” only when referring to a legal term of art
such as “Indian affairs” or the “Indian Commerce Clause,” when such will provide greater clarity, or when quoting another source. While I recognize that these terms are outdated, they are common in the scholarly discourse.
4
Lara, 541 U.S. at 199 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-261, at 3–4 (1991) (Conf.
Rep.)); see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (identifying
tribes as “domestic dependent nations”).
5
Id. at 200.
6
Id. (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)).
7
Id. at 201 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
8
Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)).
1
2
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tribes.” 9 No matter, however, as “this Court has explicitly stated
that the statute in no way affected Congress’ plenary powers to
legislate on problems of Indians.” 10 Additionally, as Indian affairs
“were more an aspect of military and foreign policy than a subject
of domestic or municipal law” during the nation’s first century,
“Congress’ legislative authority would rest in part, not upon affirmative grants of the Constitution, but upon the Constitution’s
adoption of preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any
Federal Government, namely, powers that this Court has described as necessary concomitants of nationality.” 11 Thus, with
the evisceration of the president’s power to treat with the tribes,
the plenary power to regulate Indian affairs was lodged in the
Indian Commerce Clause and in “necessary,” “preconstitutional”
powers that had some origin in foreign and military policy.
Although concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence
Thomas castigated the majority for “utterly” failing to find any
enumerated power justifying Congress’s plenary power to alter
tribal sovereignty. 12 With regard to the treaty power, he thought
it “the one mechanism that the Constitution clearly provides for
the Federal Government to interact with sovereigns other than
the States” and thus regarded the congressional act abrogating
tribal treaty-making with alarm. 13 With regard to the Indian
Commerce Clause, Justice Thomas was adamant that it did not
provide plenary power over Indian affairs, 14 and noted that the
Court in United States v. Kagama 15 had held such a construction
of the Clause to be “very strained.” 16 Elsewhere, Justice Thomas
has regarded assertions of Congress’s plenary power as “inconsistent” with Indian Commerce Clause history. 17 For the
Lara, 541 U.S. at 201.
Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194,
203 (1975)).
11 Id. (quotation marks omitted).
12 Id. at 215, 224 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (quotation marks omitted).
13 Id. at 215.
14 Lara, 541 U.S. at 224 (quoting id. at 200 (majority opinion)).
15 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
16 Lara, 541 U.S. at 224 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378–79).
17 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 660 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring);
see also United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[T]he Court created this new power [over Indian affairs] because it was unable to find an
enumerated power justifying the federal Major Crimes Act, which for the first time punished crimes committed by Indians against Indians on Indian land.”); Upstate Citizens for
Equal., Inc. v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 2587, 2587 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the
denials of certiorari) (“[P]recedents have acquiesced in Congress’ assertion of a plenary
9

10
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Founders, Indian commerce was Indian trade, and was further
limited to tribes, not persons. 18
Justices Breyer and Thomas’s debate in Lara not only encapsulates the tensions between tribal sovereignty and congressional plenary power, but also the array of scholarly opinions on
point. While all modern scholars accept tribal sovereignty as a
given, there is much disagreement over the origins of plenary
power. Taking his cue from Justice Breyer, one scholar on the
far left preaches Indian affairs as a “preconstitutional” federal
power; whatever power the Indian Commerce Clause excludes is
imbibed into the Constitution by “necessity.” 19 Another pragmatist approach relies on international law and notions of “inherent sovereignty” that are outside of but not inconsistent with the
Constitution to supply needed federal power over tribal affairs. 20
A more moderate position draws on both pragmatist approaches
and adds to them the totality of the Constitution’s discrete texts
as grounded in the Washington administration’s accommodation
in asserting general federal power to treat with and prospectively
legislate concerning Natives. 21 Yet another scholar looks carefully
at the same textual sources before determining that no general
power over Native Americans exists, but that each tribe requires individual treatment. 22 Liberal originalists conclude that
the Indian Commerce Clause may be read broadly to embrace
all Indian affairs, 23 while most conservative originalists follow

power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs. But neither the text nor the original understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause supports Congress’ claim to such plenary
power.” (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted)).
18 Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 659–60 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas
went further to assert, “the Clause was understood to reserve to the States general police
powers with respect to Indians who were citizens of the several States.” Id. at 660. For a
further discussion of Justice Thomas’s views and the authority upon which he relies, see
infra notes 169–78 and accompanying text.
19 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal Power, 82 TUL. L. REV.
509, 562 (2007).
20 Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 37
(1996) (“[P]lenary power in federal Indian law, like that in immigration law, arose from
conceptions of the inherent sovereignty of nations under international law.”).
21 See M. Alexander Pearl, Originalism and Indians, 93 TUL. L. REV. 269, 296–97
(2018). See also generally Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124
YALE L.J. 1012 (2015).
22 See generally Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1069 (2004).
23 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107 (2005)
(explaining that a broad reading of “Commerce” is most compatible with the Framers’
general goal of enabling Congress to regulate “all interactions (and altercations) with . . .
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Justice Thomas’s line that “commerce” is synonymous with
“trade,” 24 and that any expansive powers over Indian affairs are
illegitimate. Each theory claims historical legitimacy, but none
has been able to explain why the Indian Affairs Clause from the
Articles of Confederation failed to appear in the Constitution.
Whatever their disagreement over federal power as it
touches Natives, all scholars and Indian affairs historians can
agree with Justice Thomas when, in addressing the inherent inconsistencies between tribal sovereignty and congressional plenary power, he concluded: “Federal Indian policy is, to say the
least, schizophrenic. And this confusion continues to infuse federal Indian law and our cases.” 25 Commenting on the tension,
Professor Philip Frickey decried the entire genre as “rooted in
conflicting principles that leave the field in a morass of doctrinal
and normative incoherence” 26 and thus anomalous. 27 Similarly,
Professor Steven McSloy called the field “chaotic” and “confused,” 28 and Professor Joseph Singer noted that the area of law
is known for its “[c]onflicting lines of precedent and conflicting

Indian tribes” (emphasis in original)); see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 13,
155–56 (2011).
24 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 281–97 (rev. ed. 2014); Prakash, supra note 22, at 1088–89
(“[N]o historical evidence supports the view that the original meaning of the phrase ‘regulate commerce . . . with the Indian tribes’ granted Congress a plenary power over Indian tribes.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Robert G. Natelson, The Original
Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 201, 215–18 (2007)
(noting that eighteenth-century speakers understood “commerce” with Native tribes to
be exclusively trade with Natives, rather than as an umbrella term encompassing other
interactions); see also Nathan Speed, Note, Examining the Interstate Commerce Clause
Through the Lens of the Indian Commerce Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 467, 473–78 (2007)
(reviewing early congressional acts to find that Congress did not regulate internal tribal
matters via the Indian Commerce Clause); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 238–45 (2002) (relying on
originalist history to deny congressional plenary power and assert a strong version of
tribal sovereignty).
25 Lara, 541 U.S. at 219 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
26 Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1754 (1997); see also Maggie Blackhawk,
Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1797
(2019) (first quoting Lara, 541 U.S. at 214–15 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment);
and then quoting Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 433, 440 (2005)).
27 Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119
HARV. L. REV. 433, 440 (2005).
28 Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st
Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 217, 218, 220 (1993).
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philosophies.” 29 In this unique area of the law, the disharmony between sovereignty and plenary power is perpetuated by an unexplained textual shrinkage between the Articles of Confederation
and Constitution that seems to suggest that the Framers made a
mistake in drafting the Constitution.
In fact, the Framers did make a mistake, at least initially.
This Article examines the drafting history of the Constitution
and suggests a startling explanation for the omission of an
Indian Affairs Clause: at its heart, an innocent but consequential
scrivener’s error that was later made intentional. The Committee
of Detail, tasked by the Constitutional Convention with producing a working draft of the Constitution, seems to have accidentally omitted an Indian Affairs Clause in preparing the first
working draft of the Constitution. Not only was inclusion of a
congressional power over Indian affairs compelled by its long
prehistory and a unanimous vote by the Convention, but John
Rutledge as Committee chair recorded a committee vote directing James Wilson to include it. 30 The evidence indicates that
Wilson meant to comply with the command: not only was he
personally motivated to comply, but he placed a check mark next
to the Clause. However, he simply failed to include the power in
his final draft. 31
When James Madison caught the mistake, this time the
Committee of Detail partially fixed the omission by inserting
“Indians” into the Commerce Clause at the last moment, but intentionally omitted the Indian Affairs Clause, likely to expedite
the text without controversy through the Convention. 32 The error went unnoticed by the vast majority of the Convention, state
ratifying conventions, and the public at large. It was later corrected by President George Washington and his administration
via a multiclause approach to the Constitution that centered on
executive treaty-making power. 33 Nearly a century later, once
tribal treaty-making was terminated by statute, the Supreme
Court turned to other means of justifying a noncommercial
Indian affairs plenary power. 34

29 Joseph William Singer, Remembering What Hurts Us Most: A Critique of the
American Indian Law Deskbook, 24 N.M. L. REV. 315, 318 (1994).
30 See infra Part II.
31 See infra Part II.C.
32 See infra Part II.C.
33 See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
34 See, e.g., supra note 6.
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This history raises serious questions for constitutional theory
and federal Indian law policy. If the omission of the Indian affairs power was intentional, how does that impact the relationship between tribes and the federal government? Does congressional plenary power survive? How will the missing clause
impact other Commerce Clause provisions? Does a congressional
power over Indian affairs equate to plenary power? What will it
mean for tribal-state relations, and treaty powers generally? If
“Indian affairs” is intentionally missing from the Constitution, is
the approach adopted in Lara adequate? These questions will
require new tools, new methods, and new theory. The purpose of
this Article is to raise these questions and address whether congressional plenary power survives what became an intentional
omission of the Indian Affairs Clause, leaving further scholarship to propose comprehensive solutions for the remainder.
Here, based on the assumption that matching constitutional
text to powers in practice is optimal, 35 this Article proposes that,
without an Indian Affairs Clause, congressional plenary power
over tribes is dealt a mighty if not mortal blow. Instead, to enable
the federal government to address Indian affairs, this Article proposes the reinitiation of tribal treaty-making. This proposal takes
its cue from President Washington: interpret the Constitution
holistically as written, treating with Natives on noncommercial
matters via the executive’s treaty power. Such a proposal is
supported by the text, history, and structure of the Constitution,
the recent trends in federal Indian law precedent, and many
prudential reasons—including, most importantly, respect for
tribal sovereignty and Native dignity.
In the three substantive sections that follow, this Article will
first summarize the scholarly debate regarding congressional
plenary power over tribes and the different strains of pre- and
postenactment history upon which they rely. Second, it will
carefully comb through Committee of Detail, Constitutional
Convention, and ratification records to reconstruct the history of
the missing clause. Finally, it will discuss the significance of the
missing clause and propose the reinitiation of tribal treatymaking, outlining the various reasons for doing so.

35 I am cognizant that this is not a universally shared presumption, nor is it consistently applied for at least some areas of the Constitution.
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I. THE CONFUSED STATE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
The omission of an Indian Affairs Clause led to a disjuncture between Congress’s plenary power over tribes in practice
and the authorizing text of the Constitution. This schism has
created confusion as scholars have sought to synthesize and
bring harmony to this beleaguered area of constitutional law.
Scholarly opinions run the gamut, and each explicitly or implicitly partakes of a particular pre- or postconstitutional historical
approach to tribes. However, all have missed the true cause of
the problem, plaguing their various diagnoses and prognoses, and
failing to provide clarity and direction to this chaotic area of law.
A.

The Pragmatists: Pre- and Extraconstitutional Powers

The ways and means by which scholars of federal Indian
law have addressed the plenary power disparity between text
and practice are aptly reflected or presaged by Justices Breyer’s
and Thomas’s opinions in Lara. 36 On one side of the spectrum,
Professor Matthew Fletcher picks up on the verbiage utilized by
Justice Breyer in identifying Indian affairs as a “preconstitutional” federal power inherited by the federal government under
the new Constitution, of which the Commerce Clause vests only
a part. 37 The remainder of these powers should be ascribed to
the federal government by “necessity.” 38 Says Fletcher,
“Originalists . . . [are] unwilling or unable to recognize the history
of federal-tribal relations because that history is not reflected in
the Constitution.” 39 Fletcher partakes here in a much larger literature on inherent sovereignty centering on the constitutionally
unfettered foreign affairs power from United States v. CurtissWright, 40 which limited the doctrine of enumerated powers to
“internal affairs” and espoused international powers as “necessary concomitants of nationality” whether or not found in the
Constitution. 41 Professor Sarah Cleveland postulated that Justice
George Sutherland’s inherent-sovereignty argument in CurtissWright is partly founded in the expansive late nineteenth-century
view of Congress’s tribal plenary power that fully flowered in

36
37
38
39
40
41

See supra notes 20–29 and accompanying text.
See Fletcher, supra note 19, at 510–11 (citing Lara, 541 U.S. at 201).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 563 (emphasis in original).
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Id. at 316–17.
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Kagama: the lack of constitutional text and the fact that tribal
members fell outside of the Constitution’s protections and traditional state boundaries gave rise to a plenary power rooted not
in the Constitution, but in the necessities of sovereignty. 42
Although Kagama claims no basis in history other than naked discovery, Fletcher’s history is largely on point: the area of
Indian affairs was separate and distinct from Indian commerce,
and the former did not always embrace the latter. Both operated
as separate administrative structural concepts and legal terms
of art, with Indian commerce being informed by the practicalities of Indian affairs. Prior to and even concurrent with the
Constitution’s enactment, “Indian affairs” was a thriving area of
federal and royal administration that was distinct from Indian
trade or commerce. 43 Before 1789, while Indian affairs and trade
fluctuated between local and centralized control, the two bodies
of law were often addressed and administered by the same personnel but treated separately based on their distinct concerns. 44
During the earlier colonial period in the seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, the local colonial government—under loose
and sporadic oversight from the London Board of Trade and other European epicenters with colonies in North America—
managed transacting with Natives, whether through learning
new agricultural techniques, conducting land acquisitions, or
waging war and peace. 45 Here, the London Board of Trade’s
42 Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 11, 25, 37, 58–63 (2002); see also Nell Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its
Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 197 (1984) (tracing the origins
of congressional plenary power over tribes and concluding that the initial reasons for
plenary power are “no longer applicable”); Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the
Plenary Power of Congress over Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams’ Algebra, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 418–30 (1988) (accepting plenary power with all its
historical flaws because it is not “absolute,” because it is “counterbalanced” by inherent
tribal sovereignty, because of the author’s faith in the discretion of Congress, and because of his lack of faith in public international law to protect indigenous rights).
43 See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV.
1055, 1064–89 (1995).
44 See id.
45 Id. at 1066–67; see also RUSSELL SHORTO, THE ISLAND AT THE CENTER OF THE
WORLD 42–66 (2005) (narrating the history of other North American colonizers, particularly the Dutch in New Holland and New Amsterdam). Such occasional direction was
exercised in response to Native petitions, such as the 1665 instruction from King
Charles II’s royal commissioners that colonists could not deprive Natives of their land,
including hunting lands and other uncultivated areas, unless acquired with a just conquest and within the remit of the colonial charter. See COMMISSIONERS’ DECLARATION
ABOUT SQUAMACUCK LANDS (Apr. 4, 1665), reprinted in 4 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR
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governance role indicates that the administration of Indian affairs grew out of the need to compete with the French and regulate the fur trade with the Natives, which was conducted by licensed and independent private traders. 46
Beginning in the early 1700s, the British Crown exercised
increasing control over Indian affairs, climaxing with its
Proclamation of 1763 and waning thereafter due to an excess of
efficient administration. 47 Land disputes—the most famous of
them being the Mohegan’s seventy-year suit filed in 1703 with
the Privy Council against Connecticut for violations of aboriginal title granted under treaties and agreements dating between
1659 and 1681—gave rise to increasing control by the Crown. 48
Of equal importance to the British was competing with the
French and Spanish for access to Indian trade routes, 49 which
helped to spark the French and Indian War. 50 In response to
disputes over Native land and trade, Archibald Kennedy, a New
York Council member, recommended to the Board of Trade in
1751 that Indian affairs in the British North American colonies
be overseen by a single superintendent. 51 This recommendation
ultimately resulted in the Albany Congress of 1754, 52 wherein
Benjamin Franklin reported a draft Plan of Union for the colonies,
with Indian affairs featuring among the first topics addressed. 53
COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 176, 176 (Nathanial B.
Shurtleff ed., Boston, Press of William White 1854) [hereinafter 4 RECORDS OF THE
GOVERNOR]; HIS MAJESTY’S INSTRUCTION REQUIRING HIS COMMISSIONERS TO INFORM
THEMSELVES OF THE INDIAN PRINCES (May 5, 1665), reprinted in 4 RECORDS OF THE
GOVERNOR, supra, at 189, 189–90; COURT’S ANSWER TO THE SIXTH INSTRUCTION AND
COMMISSIONERS’ PROPOSAL (May 11, 1665), reprinted in 4 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR,
supra, at 198, 198–99.
46 See HAROLD A. INNIS, THE FUR TRADE IN CANADA 38 (rev. ed. 1956). See also generally Mark K. Bauman, Jews and the Fur Trade Along the Southern British Colonial Borderlands, 102 AM. JEWISH HIST. 195 (2018) (detailing the history of private Jewish traders
in colonial America and emphasizing fur traders’ importance to colonial governments).
47 Clinton, supra note 43, at 1095–96.
48 Id. at 1067–69.
49 Id. at 1069–71 (noting that the Board of Trade stressed “the importance of a
growing and coordinated trade with the Indians to combat French influence”).
50 R.R. PALMER, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 289–90 (10th ed. 2007).
51 ARCHIBALD KENNEDY, THE IMPORTANCE OF GAINING AND PRESERVING THE
FRIENDSHIP OF THE INDIANS TO THE BRITISH INTEREST CONSIDERED 15 (London, St.
John’s Gate 1752).
52 The Congress was attended by representatives from New York, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, as well as
by representatives from the Six Nations, the Scaakticook, and the Stockbridge Indians.
Clinton, supra note 43, at 1077–79.
53 LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR DE LANCEY TO THE LORDS OF TRADE (July 22, 1754), reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW
AND
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Under this plan, it was proposed that the “President General”
would
hold or direct all Indian Treaties . . . and make peace or declare War with the Indian Nations. That they make such
Laws as they judge necessary for the regulating all Indian
Trade. That they make all purchases from Indians for the
Crown, of lands [now] not within the bounds of particular
Colonies, or that shall not be within their bounds when
some of them are reduced to more convenient dimensions.
That they make new settlements on such purchases by
granting Lands, [in the King’s name] reserving a Quit rent
to the Crown, for the use of the General Treasury. 54
Franklin thus laid out all that was later comprehended by Indian
“Trade” and “Affairs” under the Articles of Confederation, while
also highlighting the complicated and delicate balance of power
between central authorities and the colonies-cum-states.
The draft plan was accompanied by a report on the state of
Indian affairs for the Board of Trade that complained of corruption and private gain, land fraud (or inadequate consideration
for land sales), and the illegal sale of rum to the Natives. 55 Colonel William Johnson authored a parallel report recommending
more coordination “between the several [colonial] Govern[ments]
. . . in regard to Indian affairs” to combat the French. 56 Almost
simultaneously, the Board of Trade recommended to the Crown
that management of Indian affairs be brought under one head
(Johnson’s) and, after reviewing the Albany reports, emphasized
the importance of separating private trading interests and the
public administration of Indian affairs. 57 Other than Johnson’s
appointment to superintend Indian affairs with the Six Nations
in the North and West and, later, Edmond Atkin’s and then
John Stuart’s appointments to administer affairs in the South,
any action on the foregoing reports was scuttled by the outbreak
YORK 850, 850 (E.B. O’Callaghan ed., Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. Printers 1855) [hereinafter 6 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO NEW YORK]; PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLONIAL
CONGRESS HELD AT ALBANY (July 25, 1754), reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO
NEW YORK, supra, at 853, 889–92.
54 PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLONIAL CONGRESS HELD AT ALBANY, supra note 53, at
890 (alterations in original).
55 Clinton, supra note 43, at 1079–80.
56 COLONEL JOHNSON’S SUGGESTIONS FOR DEFEATING THE DESIGNS OF THE FRENCH
(July 1754), reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO NEW YORK, supra note 53, at 897, 898.
57 REPRESENTATION TO THE KING WITH PLAN OF GENERAL CONCERT (Aug. 9, 1754),
reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO NEW YORK, supra note 52, at 901, 902.
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of war with the French. 58 The tide had turned, however, and the
British were more active in managing Indian affairs, including
proscribing private land acquisitions. 59 Indian trade was left
more to local colonial management. 60
After the war, to secure its peace, Britain emphasized the
importance of Indian trade as a means to improve general affairs. Emphasizing that “a well Regulated Trade with the Indians
is and ever will be the most natural and the most efficacious
means to improve and extend His Majesty’s Indian Interest” and
that treaties regarding native lands should be “religiously observed,” Johnson recommended expanding the Crown’s management of both “Indian Affairs and Trade” through the establishment of an office in the North American colonies. 61 Further
Anglo-American settlement was halted and centralized under
the Board of Trade, whereupon applications for trading outposts
and settlements near French-controlled Canada (and in formerly
French-controlled areas) poured in. 62 British encroachment fomented Native rebellion in the form of Pontiac’s War, 63 which
prompted the creation of new boundary lines that featured in
King George III’s Proclamation of 1763. 64 The Proclamation also
treated land acquisitions and trade separately, with the former
to be managed by London, and the latter by both colonial governors—who issued trading licenses to all British subjects—and
the Crown’s “Commissaries,” who regulated the trade. 65 The
Board of Trade thereafter recommended a comprehensive plan
to effectuate the Proclamation, 66 but it was stillborn. The plan
failed due to high marginal costs and the lowered threat posed
by the French and Native tribes made possible by the very efficiency that produced the plan. 67

Clinton, supra note 43, at 1082, 1086–87.
Id. at 1082–83.
60 Id.
61 SIR WILLIAM JOHNSON TO THE LORDS OF TRADE (May 17, 1759), reprinted in 7
DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 375, 377
(E.B. O’Callaghan ed., Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. Printers 1856) [hereinafter 7
DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO NEW YORK] (emphasis added).
62 Clinton, supra note 43, at 1088.
63 Id. at 1088–89.
64 PROCLAMATION BY KING GEORGE III (1763) (transcript available in the Gilder
Lehrman Collection).
65 Id.
66 PLAN FOR THE FUTURE MANAGEMENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (1764), reprinted in 7
DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO NEW YORK, supra note 61, at 637, 637–41.
67 Clinton, supra note 43, at 1095–96.
58
59
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British understanding became American, and affairs and
trade with Natives were treated as distinct concerns and even
administered separately. During the Revolution, Indian affairs
reached war and peace, land acquisitions, and powers incidental
to these main headings: protection, border policing, and gift giving. Almost immediately after Lexington and Concord, American
commissioners set out to persuade the Six Nations and other
tribes to enter the war on their side. 68 Throughout the war, the
thrust of Indian affairs continued to be war and peace, 69 but any
attempts to convince Natives to side with the rebels were largely
futile, with tribes opting for the familiar and stronger British
ally. 70 Beyond cultivating them as allies, Congress also attempted to devise a plan for “carrying on trade with the Indians,” designating a separate committee for the purpose. 71
Congressional powers of treaty-making and trade with Native
tribes informed the language of the Articles of Confederation, as
did the confederated structure wherein states still held the balance of power. Benjamin Franklin, who had authored the Albany
Plan, dealt with Native Nations in two parts of his draft of the
Articles of Confederation, reported on July 21, 1775. 72 Article X
proscribed colonies (soon to be states) from waging war sua
sponte, and Article XI dealt with land disputes and acquisitions
and ensured the presence of agents to protect and regulate
trade. 73 No mention was made of state regulation. A later draft
68 CHARLES PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER 69–72 (1956); see, e.g.,
A SPEECH TO THE SIX CONFEDERATE NATIONS, MOHAWKS, ONEIDAS, TUSCARORAS,
ONONDAGAS, CAYUGAS, SENEKAS, FROM THE TWELVE UNITED COLONIES, CONVENED IN
COUNCIL AT PHILADELPHIA (July 13, 1775), reprinted in 2 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 178, 178–83 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1906) [hereinafter 2 J.C.C.]; Documents 3–31, reprinted in 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS 8,
8–277 (Alden T. Vaughan ed., 1979); Debates (Dec. 28, 1775), reprinted in 3 JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 462, 462 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1906) [hereinafter 3 J.C.C.] (“That an order be drawn on the treasurers in favor of Mr. [George]
Wythe, ||one of the committee appointed to confer with the Indians,|| for the sum of £5
[=13 1/3 dollars,] as a present to the Indians.” (alterations in original)).
69 See Documents 3–31, supra note 68, at 8–277.
70 See Adam F. Kinney, The Tribe, the Empire, and the Nation: Enforceability of
Pre-Revolutionary Treaties with Native American Tribes, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 897,
908 (2008) (describing how many Native American tribes aligned with the British out of
fear that independent colonies would disrupt their political security).
71 Debates (Nov. 23, 1775), reprinted in 3 J.C.C., supra note 68, at 364, 366; see also
generally REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE WITH THE INDIANS (Dec. 29, 1775), reprinted in 3 J.C.C., supra note 68, at 465.
72 FRANKLIN’S ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (July 21, 1775), reprinted in 2 J.C.C.,
supra note 68, at 195, 195–99.
73 Id. at 197–98.
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also treated the two related areas of law individually, giving the
central government the sole and exclusive power of “[r]egulating
the Indian Trade, and managing all Indian Affairs with the
Indians.” 74 The final version of the Articles of Confederation contained less detail, but also treated trade and affairs individually.
Penned by John Dickinson in 1776, 75 passed by Congress on
November 15, 1777, and finally ratified by all states on March 1,
1781, Article IX read in relevant part:
The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also have the
sole and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the trade
and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of
any of the States; provided that the legislative right of any
State, within its own limits, be not infringed or violated. 76
Treaty-making and legislation under the Articles followed
suit. As they were not mentioned in the 1783 Treaty of Paris,
Congress set about to make peace with tribes who had allied
with the British in the Revolution. 77 After lengthy discussion
based on Pennsylvania’s petition to treat with western tribes in
purchasing lands for war veterans, Congress approved a treaty
conference with northern and western district tribes on October
15, 1783, to which Pennsylvania commissioners would be invited
and provided “every assistance” in promoting state interests
consistent with the “general interest of the Union.” 78 This authorization resulted in the Treaty at Fort Stanwix with the Six
Nations on October 22, 1784, which dealt with hostages, the establishment of a western boundary, land guarantees to Natives,
and a cession of land to the United States. 79 A similar treaty was
entered into at Fort M’Intosh with the Wiandot, Delaware,
Chippewa, and Ottawa on January 21, 1785, adding that Natives
murdering or robbing a citizen of the United States would be delivered up for punishment by the same. 80 These treaties were
thus limited to nontrade matters.
74 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION (July 12, 1776), reprinted
in 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 546, 550 (Worthington Chauncey Ford
ed., 1906) (alterations in original).
75 Id. at 546 n.1 (identifying the original manuscript as in the writing of John
Dickinson).
76 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, ¶ 4.
77 Clinton, supra note 43, at 1105.
78 See generally Debates (Oct. 30, 1783), reprinted in 25 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 767 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922) [hereinafter 25 J.C.C.].
79 See generally Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15.
80 Treaty of Fort M’Intosh art. IX, Jan. 21, 1785, 7 Stat. 16, 17.
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In 1785, Congress issued authorization for commissioners
in the South to conduct treaty conferences to establish land
boundaries, regulate fair trade with Natives, and notify the governors of the affected states. 81 This authorization resulted in
three successive treaties at Hopewell with the Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw. These treaties reflected similar provisions
to their predecessors, but added that tribes could send delegations to Congress and assured the liberty of traders while guaranteeing that “the United States in Congress assembled shall
have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with
the Indians, and managing all their affairs in such manner as
they think proper.” 82 A final treaty was entered into with the
Shawnee on January 31, 1786, without the trade provisions; 83
all four southern treaties were approved by Congress on April
17, 1786, a year before the convening of the Constitutional
Convention. 84
In the aftermath of this treaty-making with the various regions, Congress turned its attention to comprehensive legislation regulating Indian trade in “An Ordinance for [R]egulating
the Indian Department.” 85 Whereas states still vied for a role in
treating over Native lands, debate over the proposed statute revealed a consensus in favor of centralized Indian trade regulation. 86 Delegates of Georgia and North Carolina, where Cherokee
81 REPORT ON THE STATE OF SOUTHERN INDIAN AFFAIRS (Mar. 4, 1785), reprinted in
28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 118, 118–20 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
1933); COMMISSION FOR PERSONS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE INDIANS (Mar. 12, 1784), reprinted
in 26 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 134, 134–35 (Gillard Hunt ed., 1928).
82 Treaty of Hopewell art. IX, Cherokee-U.S., Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18, 20; Treaty
of Hopewell art. VIII, Choctaw-U.S., Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21, 22; Treaty of Hopewell
art. VIII, Chickasaw-U.S., Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24, 25.
83 See generally Treaty at the Mouth of the Great Miami, Shawnee-U.S., 7 Stat.
26 (1786).
84 30 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 185–95 (John C. Fitzptrick ed.,
1934) [hereinafter 30 J.C.C.]; Clinton, supra note 43, at 1120.
85 See PROPOSED ORDINANCE FOR REGULATING THE INDIAN DEPARTMENT (June 28,
1786), reprinted in 30 J.C.C. at 368, 368–72:

[Regional commissioners] shall superintend such regulations as Congress shall
from time to time establish respecting the Indian trade. They shall have Authority to place deputies among the several tribes and to remove all or either of
them for misbehavior. To grant licenses to the traders, to regulate the advance
on Articles of the first Necessity. . . .
86 MOTION BY WILLIAM FEW TO AMEND THE ORDINANCE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS (July
20, 1786), reprinted in 30 J.C.C., supra note 84, at 418, 418–19; MOTION BY WILLIAM
HOUSTOUN TO AMEND THE ORDINANCE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS (July 21, 1786), reprinted in
30 J.C.C., supra note 84, at 420, 420–21 (accepting an amendment to strike the granting
of licenses by federal commissioners); MOTION BY CHARLES PINCKNEY TO AMEND THE
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and other southern tribes (with whom those states had separately
treated) resided, repeatedly sought without success to secure a
role for states in regulating Indian trade. 87 Yet even New York,
normally opposed along with Pennsylvania and Virginia to national regulation of land cessions and border disputes, was firm
in recognizing national authority to regulate trade. 88
Now that a consensus appeared to have congealed around
federal trading power with Native Nations, the next year, in
1787, efforts were made to secure another major piece of legislation. This sought to shore up confederated power over both Indian trade and affairs after attacks by Natives on Virginian frontiers and land disputes between Creeks and Georgians
threatened open hostilities. 89 Ironically, this act was discussed
in the Continental Congress even while the Convention sat, forgetting and then omitting Indian affairs. 90 The disparity in
treatment between the two bodies is highlighted by the overlap
in membership between Congress and the Convention. In fact,
at least three members of the Constitutional Convention—
William Few of Georgia, William Blount of North Carolina, and
Pierce Butler of South Carolina 91—used the break allotted for the
work of drafting the Constitution by the Committee of Detail from
July 24 to August 6, 1787, to travel to New York and attend to
their congressional duties. Four days before the Committee of
ORDINANCE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS (July 24, 1786), reprinted in 30 J.C.C., supra note 84, at
424, 424–28; Debate (Aug. 4, 1786), reprinted in 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 485, 485 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1934) [hereinafter 31 J.C.C.]; MOTION BY
EDWARD CARRINGTON TO AMEND THE ORDINANCE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS (Aug. 7, 1786), reprinted in 31 J.C.C., supra, at 488–90; AN ORDINANCE FOR THE REGULATION OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS (Aug. 7, 1786), reprinted in 31 J.C.C., supra, at 490–93.
87 Clinton, supra note 43, at 1120–24.
88 Id. at 1123 (“Even the delegates from New York were apparently unwilling to
abandon national coordination of trade with the Indians.”).
89 See VOTE REGARDING THE VIRGINIA EXPEDITION AGAINST THE INDIANS (Aug. 2,
1787), reprinted in 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 449, 449–50 (Roscoe R.
Hill ed., 1936) [hereinafter 33 J.C.C.] (refusing to reimburse Virginia for expenses incurred in the “late expedition against the Indians” conducted without the direction or
knowledge of the United States); REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS IN THE
SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT (Aug. 3, 1787), reprinted in 33 J.C.C., supra, at 455, 456
(“[T]here is reason to apprehend the Creek Indians are meditating a serious blow against
the Inhabitants of Georgia.”).
90 See THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (July 13, 1787), reprinted in 32 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 334, 334–43 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936) (prescribing rules for
the settlement of western lands and promising “utmost good faith” toward Natives days
before the Convention let out for its singular recess); see also Clinton, supra note 43, at
1124–28.
91 See Debate (Aug. 2, 1787), reprinted in 33 J.C.C., supra note 89, at 449–54.
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Detail reported a draft of the Constitution that contained no
mention of Indian trade or affairs, Nathan Dane of Massachusetts reported for the congressional committee on Indian affairs
in New York. 92 Responding to Henry Knox’s July 10 and 18,
1787, reports on the Virginia border and Georgia-Creek disputes, Dane identified the ambiguous language respecting Indian affairs in the Articles as “embarrassing” having set federal
efforts at odds with the states. 93 A correct interpretation of the
Articles’ language, Dane maintained, was based on longstanding precedent:
The committee conceive that . . . in managing affairs with
[the Natives], the principal objects have been those of making war and peace, purchasing certain tracts of their lands,
fixing the boundaries between them and our people, and
preventing the latter settling on lands left in possession of
the former. The powers necessary to these objects appear to
the committee to be indivisible, and that the parties to the
confederation must have intended to give them entire to the
Union, or to have given them entire to the State. 94
Power over Indian affairs, including power over Indian
trade (but which was treated individually), was indivisible due
to its very nature. Dane’s argument was ultimately successful:
on October 26, 1787, five weeks after the Convention adjourned
(with the absent congressmen from Philadelphia again attending), the Continental Congress authorized solely northern and
southern Indian commissioners to treat with tribes. 95
This history demonstrates that both Indian affairs and
trade were preconstitutional powers as articulated by Fletcher. 96
The two bodies of law were closely related and often (but not always) administered together, but treated separately and distinctly within the law. The law of Indian trade related to the
private conduct of Indian traders, including licensing; banning
unethical practices such as selling firearms, rum and other spirits, and other prohibited items to Natives; and establishing or

92 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS IN THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT
(Aug. 3, 1787), reprinted in 33 J.C.C., supra note 89, at 455, 455.
93 Id. at 457.
94 Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
95 RESOLUTION ON HOLDING TREATIES WITH NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN INDIANS
(Oct. 3, 1787), reprinted in 33 J.C.C., supra note 89, at 706, 707–14.
96 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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protecting trading posts and routes. 97 The law and administration
of Indian affairs related to intergovernmental relationships between various levels of government and Native Nations, including identifying boundaries, preserving Native land and the ability to purchase it by particular governments, and maintaining
legal relations between Natives and non-Natives. 98 Indian affairs, a matter of public law, could but did not always embrace
Indian trade, a matter of private law. 99 Thus, according to
Fletcher, the Indian Commerce Clause embraced all of preconstitutional Indian trade—but not all of Indian affairs. 100
Fletcher’s remaining arguments do not hold together as well.
Fletcher maintains that the Constitution’s deficient statements
regarding Indian Affairs give rise to a necessity that Congress,
and perhaps the president, must derive power over Indian affairs from preconstitutional arrangements. 101 Yet even despite
the glaring textual problem with Fletcher’s argument, it should
not end here. As explained below, preconstitutional federal powers over Natives were contested, or at least states made claims
to having overlapping powers. 102
Professor Frickey expands on Fletcher’s pragmatist theme,
but ties power over Natives more directly to the Constitution
in a generalist way via international law: “[I]nherent in the
Constitution, not outside the Constitution, are all those notions
of inherent sovereignty under international law that are not inconsistent with constitutional text, structures, or institutional
relationships.” 103 International law, rather than direct constitutional grants, provides content for managing Native relations
and guarantees to them human rights via international standards
regarding indigenous peoples. 104
97 The law of Indian trade may be distinguished from the objects of that trade,
which, as Professor Gregory Ablavsky articulates, included a wide range of goods, from
traditional items (blankets and furs) to Native and European slaves, “paying” goods to
murder victims, and the most valuable form of payment, land. Ablavsky, supra note 21,
at 1029–32.
98 Id. at 1042.
99 Id. at 1032.
100 Fletcher, supra note 19, at 522 (“The text of the Indian Commerce Clause suggests (perhaps) that congressional authority in the field of Indian affairs is less than
plenary, if one accepts the argument that ‘commerce’ does not include the entire field.”).
101 Id. at 555.
102 See infra notes 154–66 and accompanying text.
103 Frickey, supra note 20, at 68.
104 Id. at 74–75; see also Pearl, supra note 21, at 326–27 (noting that this conception
is in conflict with the originalist position that government action can only arise from an
enumerated power).
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The Holists and the Washington Settlement

A more moderate approach is Professor Gregory Ablavsky’s
carefully crafted holistic and intratextual reading of the
Constitution’s treatment of Indian affairs in Beyond the Indian
Commerce Clause. 105 There, Ablavsky also focuses on the role of
the supra- and preconstitutional law of nations, particularly on
those international legal principles from the law of nations that
influenced the Washington administration’s interpretation and
implementation of the Constitution, in deducing plenary power. 106 Implicitly acknowledging that affairs and commerce are
not coterminous, this holistic interpretation asserts that congressional plenary power later asserted over Indian affairs did
not necessarily derive from the Indian Commerce Clause, but
had alternate sources of power in the Treaty, War Powers,
Property, and Supremacy Clauses, as well as the extraconstitutional law of nations. 107
Ablavsky relies heavily on Secretary Henry Knox’s administration of Indian affairs both before and after the Constitution’s
ratification. 108 A month before the reinstitution of Indian affairs
within the War Department under the new Constitution, 109 Knox,
the unexpectedly effective Revolutionary War artillery officer
who carried over as Secretary of War, 110 was advising President

105 See Ablavsky, supra note 21, at 1043 (“[A] holistic reading of the Constitution
makes the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 more intelligible.”). For a definition
of “intratextualism,” see Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748
(1999) (“[V]arious words and phrases recur in the [Constitution]. This feature gives interpreters yet another set of clues as they search for constitutional meaning and gives
rise to yet another rich technique of constitutional interpretation. I call this technique
intratextualism.”).
106 See generally Ablavsky, supra note 21.
107 See id. at 1053–82.
108 Id. at 1041–42.
109 Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 49, 50 (investing the Secretary of War with
“such duties as shall . . . be enjoined on, or entrusted to him by the President of the
United States . . . relative to Indian affairs”).
110 Henry Knox, bookish and muscular as the shop-boy-turned-proprietor of the
London Bookstore, popular with the loyalist elite, possessed no military background other than that he drew from the military books he read, participating in local company
drills, and observing those of the British in Boston. MARK PULS, HENRY KNOX:
VISIONARY GENERAL OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 4–7, 12–13 (2008). His rise within
Washington’s inner camp circle was assured due to his tremendous feat in proposing and
then commanding the transport of sixty tons of Ticonderoga cannon across three hundred miles of frozen rivers and snowcapped mountains to reinforce the Boston siege at
Dorchester Heights, which cannon brought about the withdrawal of British ships. Id. at
30, 34–45.
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Washington of the state of tribal affairs. 111 Importantly, Knox
made a recommendation that would effectively ensure to the
federal government the sole regulation of Indian affairs. After
lamenting over past and ongoing state interference and Congress’s
own botched tribal treaty negotiations, Knox suggested that
[t]he independent nations and tribes of indians ought to be
considered as foreign nations, not as the subjects of any particular state—each individual State indeed will retain the
right of pre-emtion of all lands within its limits, which will
not be abridged. But the general Sovereignty must possess
the right of making all treaties on the execution or violation
of which depend peace or war. 112
Establishing such a precedent, Knox continues, should be done
via a “declarative Law” that would “reflect honor on the new
government.” 113 If tribes were treated as other nations, by implication, other aspects of the Constitution—the treaty power, and,
Ablavsky adds, war and peace powers and the Territory and
Supremacy Clauses 114—could be brought to bear on the federal
government’s dealings with Native tribes.
Surprisingly, Ablavsky does not highlight President
Washington’s response, which adopted Knox’s recommendations
wholesale. On this issue, President Washington initially availed
himself of the advice and consent of the Senate in person, with
Knox at his side, regarding a treaty with the Choctaw and
Chickasaw. 115 A month later, in a statement prepared by Knox
and read by then–Vice President John Adams as Senate president on September 17, 1789, 116 President Washington recommended that Indian tribes be treated as foreign nations:
It is said to be the general understanding and practice of
nations, as a check on the mistakes and indiscretions of
ministers or Commissioners, not to consider any treaty,
111 See LETTER FROM HENRY KNOX TO GEORGE WASHINGTON (July 6, 1789), reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 123, 123–28 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1989) [hereinafter 3 WASHINGTON PAPERS]; LETTERS FROM HENRY KNOX TO GEORGE WASHINGTON
(July 7, 1789), reprinted in 3 WASHINGTON PAPERS, supra, at 134–45.
112 LETTERS FROM HENRY KNOX TO GEORGE WASHINGTON (July 7, 1789), supra note
111, at 134–41 (emphasis added).
113 Id.
114 See Ablavsky, supra note 21, at 1043–45.
115 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 67 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); id. at 69–70; see also
PULS, supra note 110, at 205.
116 PULS, supra note 110, at 205.
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negociated, and signed by such officers, as final and conclusive untill ratified by the sovereign or government from
whom they derive their powers. [T]his practice has been
adopted by the United States, respecting their treaties with
european nations; and I am inclined to think it would be
adviseable to observe it in the conduct of our treaties with
the Indians: for tho’ such Treaties, being on their part made
by their chiefs or rulers, need not be ratified by them, yet
being formed on our part by the agency of subordinate officers, it seems to be both prudent and reasonable, that their
acts should not be binding on the nation untill approved and
ratified by the government. It strikes me that this point
should be well considered and settled, so that our national
proceedings in this respect may become uniform, and be directed by fixed and stable principles. 117
The Senate consented to President Washington’s request,
and their “advice” came in the exact form Knox had anticipated:
an Indian Trade and Intercourse Act passed in the summer of
1790, reflecting in modified format the “trade and affairs” language of the Articles. 118 As a temporary act, it was reinstated in
1793, 119 1796, 120 and 1799, 121 with permanent versions enacted in
1802 and 1834. 122 Acting through what the Senate considered as
part of its executive powers under the Advice and Consent
Clause, 123 these early Congresses effectuated a legislative sleight
of hand that skirted any contemporary textual qualms later
raised by Justice Breyer in Lara—that the treaty power was
lodged in the executive and that implementing legislation
should follow ratification. 124 Perhaps viewed as enacting legislation of the preconstitutional treaties, they incorporated language
from the Hopewell Treaties 125 into the initial 1790 legislation,

117 From George Washington to the United States Senate (Sep. 17, 1789), FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://perma.cc/A4P9-P8EN.
118 Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
119 Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329.
120 Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469.
121 Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743.
122 Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139; Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729.
123 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Throughout the First Congress, the Senate referred
to the process of responding to President Washington’s frequent queries soliciting their
advice and appropriations on tribal matters as “Executive business.” E.g., 1 ANNALS OF
CONG., supra note 115, at 69.
124 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)).
125 Supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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albeit applying it to all tribes rather than just the Cherokee and
other southern tribes. 126
Although the executive continued to treat with tribes, 127 the
Trade and Intercourse Acts set a precedent of Congress legislating outside the scope of treaty negotiations, passing, in 1817 and
again in 1819, acts decoupled from treaties regulating all Native
Nations. 128 The approach was also blessed by Chief Justice
Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia: 129 “From the commencement of
our government, congress has passed acts to regulate trade and
intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that
protection which treaties stipulate.” 130 Chief Justice Marshall’s
majority opinion reinforced the gloss that Congress had a concomitant legislative treaty power to match the president’s executive treaty power:
[The Constitution] confers on congress the powers of war
and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is
required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians. They are not limited by any restrictions on their free
actions. 131
126 TREATY WITH THE CHEROKEE (Nov. 28, 1785), reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS:
LAWS AND TREATIES 8, 8–11 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904) [hereinafter 2 INDIAN
AFFAIRS].
127 See generally id.
128 See generally, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 43, 3 Stat. 363 (authorizing continuation of a 1811 statute establishing trading houses with Indian tribes); Act of Mar. 3,
1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (authorizing federal courts to try persons, including Natives, for
crimes punishable by death committed in Native territory); Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 104,
3 Stat. 393 (appropriating funds for carrying into effect treaties with various tribes); Act
of Feb. 20, 1819, ch. 28, 3 Stat. 484 (authorizing the president to purchase lands from the
Creek nation); Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 85, 3 Stat. 516 (authorizing the president to employ instructors to teach Natives reading, writing, arithmetic, and agricultural techniques and appropriating funds for this purpose); Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 87, 3 Stat. 517
(appropriating funds for carrying into effect treaties with various tribes).
129 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
130 Id. at 556–57. Worcester, along with Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,
567 (1823), and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 22 (1831), was one part of
the “Marshall Trilogy” of early Native American cases wherein Chief Justice Marshall
upheld the Washington administration’s interpretation of Indian affairs by recognizing
the “doctrine of discovery,” empowering the United States to exclude European sovereigns from acquiring Native lands without disturbing aboriginal title, and that the Constitution governed the relationship between the United States and Native Nations.
Blackhawk, supra note 26, at 1801, 1809.
131 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559 (emphasis in original).
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Chief Justice Marshall’s decision proved durable. No new
major legislation was enacted regarding Indian affairs until
1874, 132 and the executive branch negotiated 348 treaties with
Indian Tribes through 1868. 133 Yet during Reconstruction, in
1871, Congress, through a House appropriations bill, annulled
the president’s ability to treat with Native tribes, stripping them
of Knox’s recognition as “independent nation[s]” and therefore
deeming them unfit parties “with whom the United States may
[not] contract by treaty.” 134 Thus ended the Knox-Washingtoncongressional pact regarding Indian affairs and the intratextual
approach subscribed to by Ablavsky.
One problem with Ablavsky’s holistic approach is his allusion to the Property Clause grounding the Washington administration’s assertion of power to treat with the Natives, implicitly
empowering further administrations (and Congresses) to do
likewise. 135 Professor Saikrishna Prakash points to the practical
impossibility of current Congresses regulating Indian affairs
under this justification, in that the federal government owned
only 0.7% of tribal land as of 2004. 136 Indeed, even when tribes
did occupy expansive tracts of U.S. territories, an antebellum
Congress rejected an attempt to confederate tribal governments
and subject them to a federally appointed governor under a
Western Territory bill. 137
Prakash, like Ablavsky, also looks beyond the Commerce
Clause for other textual sources from which to derive power over
Natives, but unlike Ablavsky, he finds the sum of the parts to
be less than the whole. Prakash concludes that no part of the
Constitution provides per se plenary power, but that tribes must
be treated with individually, based on consummated treaties,
tribal composition, and location. 138
132 See THE REVISED STATUTES, reprinted in 1 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES
1–22 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904). The 1832 Law establishing the Commission of Indian Affairs was amended in minor ways by the Act of Feb. 27, 1851, ch. 14, 9 Stat. 574;
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 765, 767; Act of Apr. 8, 1864, ch. 48 13 Stat. 39;
Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 299, § 6, 14 Stat. 333, 333; and Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 173, § 3,
14 Stat. 492, 492.
133 See generally 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 126.
134 25 U.S.C. § 71 (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544,
566); see also Speed, supra note 24, at 471 n.31.
135 Ablavsky, supra note 21, at 1067.
136 Prakash, supra note 22, at 1093–94.
137 10 REG. DEB. 4779 (1834).
138 See Prakash, supra note 22, at 1072 (“To assess whether tribal differences are relevant to the scope of federal power, we must examine the various treaties and landholding
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Originalists and Semantics

In contrast to the pragmatist or holistic viewpoint, liberal
originalists home in on the Indian Commerce Clause to find justification for plenary power. Professor Akhil Amar looks to draft
language from the Committee of Detail, the first Indian Trade
and Intercourse Act passed in 1790, contemporary texts, and
broad dictionary definitions to surmise that the original understanding of commerce as it pertained to Indians (and interstate
and international transactions) was broad enough to encompass
“all forms of intercourse in the affairs of life.” 139 Professor Jack
Balkin expands on this theme and highlights an amendment to
the Virginia Plan submitted to the Committee of Detail—
authorizing Congress to “legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are
separately incompetent”—as a guiding principle in interpreting
all Commerce Clause subparts broadly. 140 This Amar-Balkin interpretation squares with the Supreme Court’s holding in Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 141 quoted by Justice Breyer in
Lara, that “the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause
is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the
field of Indian affairs.” 142 However, this view is at odds with
Kagama, wherein the Court found such a broad reading
“strained,” 143 and whether implicitly conceding the point or not,
patterns of Indian tribes. After some tough slogging, it will become clear that the federal
government likely has plenary power over some tribes and not others.”).
139 AMAR, supra note 23, at 107–08, 542 n.16; cf. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution and the Yale School of Constitutional Interpretation, 115 YALE L.J. 1997, 2004 n.25
(2006) (arguing that narrow originalist interpretations of the Indian Commerce Clause are
incompatible with the Indian Intercourse Act of 1790, which regulated noneconomic interactions with Natives).
140 BALKIN, supra note 23, at 13, 144; Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1,
9–13, 24–25 (2010) (describing the implementation of an amendment into Resolution VI
and then arguing for a broad reading of “commerce”). In Living Originalism, Balkin calls
this emendation the Bedford Amendment. As incorporated into the Virginia Plan’s Resolution VI, the amended text read:
That the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the legislative
Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and moreover to legislate in
all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to
which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the
United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.
COMMITTEE OF DETAIL DOCUMENT I, reprinted in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION of 1787, at 129, 131–32 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2 FARRAND].
141 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
142 Id. at 192; Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.
143 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378–79.
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the Lara Court’s decision seems to stand for the proposition that
justifying full Indian affairs powers requires something more
than just the Indian Commerce Clause. 144
Other originalist scholars are not so permissive. Basing
their interpretation largely on linguistics and on Professor
Randy Barnett’s comprehensive word study from contemporary
texts, most other originalist scholars interpret commerce as synonymous with trade, and, with Justice Thomas, believe plenary
power exercised over Native tribes by means of the Indian
Commerce Clause to be illegitimate. 145 One study deals with the
many iterations of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts and
interprets each provision as falling short of recognizing a general plenary power over internal tribal relations. 146
D. Field Preemption
Ablavsky’s holistic and extraconstitutional approach leads
him to conclude that federal power over Indian affairs precludes
state action in this area. 147 This argument draws upon Professor
Robert Clinton’s extensive treatment of Indian Affairs history in
The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause. 148 There, Clinton details
the balance of power first between the British Crown and the colonials, and then between the Confederation Congress and the
states. He asserts that after two centuries of controversy, a consensus arose in favor of plenary power and therefore national

144 Lara, 541 U.S. at 200–01 (reasoning that the Indian Commerce Clause, in conjunction with history of the treaty power, authorizes Congress’s plenary power).
145 See BARNETT, supra note 24, at 281–97 (“So synonymous was ‘commerce’ with
‘trade’ that William Grayson worried that ‘the whole of commerce of the United States
may be exclusively carried on by merchants residing within the seat of government.’”);
Prakash, supra note 22, at 1088–89 (“[D]uring the Founding era, ‘commerce’ was a synonym for trade and did not encompass all gainful activity.”); Natelson, supra note 24, at
215–16 (performing an independent word study in eighteenth-century databases revealing that “commerce with Indian tribes” “almost invariably meant ‘trade with Indians’
and nothing more”); Clinton, supra note 24, at 115–16 (“[T]here is no acceptable, historically-derived, textual constitutional explanation for the exercise of any federal authority
over Indian tribes without their consent manifested through treaty. . . . Consequently,
neither Congress nor the federal courts legitimately can unilaterally adopt binding legal
principles for the tribes without their consent.”).
146 See Speed, supra note 24, at 467, 485 (“[T]he modern Court has reconnected the
plenary power doctrine to the Constitution. These modern connections, however, are
tenuous at best and disingenuous at worst.”); cf. Ablavsky, supra note 21, at 1043 (reading the criminal provisions of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 as evidence of an
expansive meaning).
147 Ablavsky, supra note 22, at 1050–51.
148 See id. at 1037.
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supremacy over Indian Affairs in the immediate prelude to the
Constitutional Convention that is reflected in the Constitution’s
text preempting state relations with Native Nations. 149 Indeed,
Clinton focuses upon the primary point of concern for coloniescum-states when it came to dealing with tribes as reflected in
the confused text of the Articles of Confederation. 150 That nascent constitution recognized “sole and exclusive” power over Indian trade and affairs with two exceptions that seemed to swallow the rule: Natives who were “members” of the various states
were excepted and the whole power was subject to the “legislative right[s]” of the individual states. 151 Indeed, Madison discussed the Article’s befuddlement in Federalist 42, which “subvert[ed] a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and
letting the whole remain.” 152 The Confederation Congress was
plagued by the controversy, and parallel vague language appeared in the 1786 Ordinance governing Indian affairs. 153
The controversy was even more animated out-of-doors. Just
as colonies rebuffed royal efforts to consolidate power over Indian
affairs between 1720 and 1776, 154 states pushed back or wholly
ignored asserted federal preeminence. In detailing the history of
New York’s independent relations with Native Nations, Abraham
Yates, Jr., 155 complained bitterly of the encroachment the federal
Constitution imposed on state power to treat with Natives as
New York had done at Fort Stanwix prior to the federal treaty
conference with the Six Nations in 1784 and during the many
previous decades. 156 Yates headed the local Indian affairs committee in Albany during the Revolution and personally treated
with Native tribes in 1775. 157 After quoting Article XXXVII of
See generally Clinton, supra note 43.
Id. at 1103.
151 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, ¶ 4.
152 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 269 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
153 AN ORDINANCE FOR THE REGULATION OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (Aug. 7, 1786), reprinted in 31 J.C.C., supra note 86, at 490, 490.
154 See Clinton, supra note 43, at 1096–97.
155 Professor Robert Natelson incorrectly attributes authorship to Robert Yates, who
boycotted the Convention early on, Natelson, supra note 24, at 247–48, as does Clinton,
supra note 43, at 1160. Ablavsky corrects this error. Ablavsky, supra note 21, at 1023
n.48 (citing Sydney, TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK (June 13–14, 1788),
reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
1153, 1156–67 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004)).
156 Clinton, supra note 43, at 1116.
157 CONFERENCE WITH THE SIX NATIONS AT ALBANY (1775), reprinted in 18 EARLY
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 68, at 8, 26, 561 & n.52 (“Abraham Yates, Jr.
(1724–1796) was chairman of the Albany committee [on Indian affairs] and an active
149
150
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the New York Constitution, which provided that “no purchases
or contracts for the sale of lands . . . with or of the Indians, within the limits of this State, shall be binding on the said Indians,
or deemed valid, unless made under the authority and with the
consent of the legislature of this state,” 158 Yates condemns “the
measures taken by Congress respecting the Indian affairs in
this state” as violative of the quoted provision of the New York
Constitution and the Articles relating to Indian affairs. 159 Yates
goes on to note the long history of New York individually treating with the “five nations” since 1664, and even earlier “whilst it
was called New-Nederland under the Dutch” before quoting the
language in the Articles that pertained to Indians “not members
of any of the states” and listing grievances with treaties and the
1786 statute outlined above entered by Congress. 160
Georgia had been particularly aggressive about abrogating
the Hopewell Treaties, electing instead to treat separately with
the Natives, ceding land to themselves, encouraging settlement
on lands allotted to tribes by federal commissioners, bringing
the state to the brink of war with the Creeks on the eve of the
Constitutional Convention, and unilaterally declaring war at its
close in September 1787. 161 The situation in North Carolina
trailed close behind: in 1787, Henry Knox reported to Congress
that unprovoked Anglo-American settlers seizing Native lands
had attacked the Cherokees in that state. 162 Virginia, where
speculators laid claim to vast tracts of privately purchased Native
lands, 163 was not quite so aggressive when altercations over land
broke out in its Kentucky regions, seeking the assistance of Congress before raising troops sufficient to launch their own attack.164
Congress later ratified the conduct and sent reinforcements.165

member of New York’s revolutionary committees and conventions. He was a lawyer and
state senator, and, from 1790 to 1796, he was mayor of Albany.”).
158 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVII.
159 Sydney, TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK (June 13–14, 1788), reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 155, at 1153, 1156.
160 Id. at 1157.
161 Clinton, supra note 43, at 1129–33.
162 REPORT OF SECRETARY AT WAR ON LETTER OF COLONEL J. MARTIN (July 18,
1788), reprinted in 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 342, 342–45 (Roscoe R.
Hill ed., 1937).
163 Peter Onuf, Toward Federalism: Virginia, Congress, and the Western Lands, 34
WM. & MARY Q. 353, 366–67, 370–73 (1977).
164 Clinton, supra note 43, at 1125–27.
165 Id. at 1126.
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Pennsylvania also sought to treat with their western tribes in
repaying veteran war debts with land, but first sought congressional approval, and respectfully demurred when its request was
rebuffed. 166 Although Clinton’s treatment of this history and that
of the Convention in dealing with the Articles’ states’ rights language detailed below 167 is quite nuanced and careful, he unsatisfactorily brushes over the textual history (at times with confused
sequencing) of, and the discrepancies between, Indian commerce
and affairs. In so doing, he prematurely concludes that the Indian
Commerce Clause “obviously was intended to accomplish the objectives” of the Indian affairs text proposed by Madison (but not
adopted) late in the Convention, supporting congressional plenary power and therefore federal preemption. 168
In contrast, Justice Thomas, relying on Professor Robert
Natelson, reads concurrent state powers over all Native American
relations outside of trade into the Indian Commerce Clause. 169
For support, Justice Thomas and Natelson point to the many
state attempts both before and after the Constitution to comanage tribal relations. 170 As will be seen, while states generally
recognized Congress’s power over treaties of war and peace, several tested the Articles to see how far Congress’s power to treat
with Natives over land claims extended. Virginia attempted to
condition the cessation of their western lands on the abdication
of any other claims to the land via Native purchase. 171 To this,
Congress said such prejudgment would be “improper.” 172 Pennsylvania requested time and again that Congress recognize their
ability to treat with the Natives regarding land purchases “on
their borders.” 173 As many times as it importuned, Pennsylvania’s
Id. at 1108–11.
Infra notes 278–299 and accompanying text.
168 Clinton, supra note 43, at 1153.
169 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 658–65 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring); Natelson, supra note 24, at 215–18.
170 Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 660–61 (Thomas, J., concurring); Natelson, supra
note 24, at 223–25, 265.
171 REPORT ON THE CESSION OF TERRITORY BY THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE (June 4,
1783), reprinted in 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 381, 381 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1922) [hereinafter 24 J.C.C.]; REPORT DETAILING CONDITIONS ON THE CESSION
OF TERRITORY BY THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE (Sept. 13, 1783), reprinted in 25 J.C.C., supra note 78, at 559, 561–62.
172 REPORT DETAILING CONDITIONS ON THE CESSION OF TERRITORY BY THE VIRGINIA
LEGISLATURE, supra note 171, at 562–63.
173 REPORT ON A CONFERENCE BETWEEN PENNSYLVANIA AND INDIANS (Sept. 20,
1783), reprinted in 25 J.C.C., supra note 78, at 591, 595–96; VOTE ON PENNSYLVANIA’S
REQUEST TO TREAT FOR PURCHASE OF INDIAN LANDS (Oct. 22, 1783), reprinted in 25
166
167
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entreaties were rebuffed. 174 New York also attempted to have
Congress confirm its western land conveyances to soldiers in
lieu of pay, unless such seemed to “irritate the Indians,” but in
this it, too, was denied. 175 North Carolina took greater advantage
of the distance from Congress and actually treated separately
with the Natives over land within its contested borders without
asking for congressional permission, 176 as did Georgia. 177 Thus
while it is true that states attempted to take advantage of the
Articles’ ambiguous language, these attempts were met with
varying degrees of success, and therefore Justice Thomas and
Natelson’s historical conclusions are not necessarily warranted. 178
In another seminal article, The Savage Constitution, Ablavsky
answers Clinton’s narrative identifying two competing national solutions to the federal-state contest as reflected in the Constitution:
a paternalistic but diplomatic approach as executed by President
Washington and an aggressive military solution expunging
“savages” from coveted lands which eventually won the day under President Andrew Jackson. 179 Professor Maggie Blackhawk
accepts Ablavsky’s telling of history in building out an alternative public law paradigm. 180 She categorizes those events that
J.C.C., supra note 78, at 717, 717–18; RECONSIDERATION OF PENNSYLVANIA’S REQUEST
TO TREAT FOR PURCHASE OF INDIAN LANDS (Oct. 30, 1783), reprinted in 25 J.C.C., supra
note 78, at 760, 762–64.
174 REPORT ON A CONFERENCE BETWEEN PENNSYLVANIA AND INDIANS, supra note
173, at 592, 596; VOTE ON PENNSYLVANIA’S REQUEST TO TREAT FOR PURCHASE OF INDIAN
LANDS, supra note 173, at 718–19; RECONSIDERATION OF PENNSYLVANIA’S REQUEST TO
TREAT FOR PURCHASE OF INDIAN LANDS, supra note 173, at 762–64. Finally, Congress
approved that the Indian affairs commissioners appointed by Congress should represent
the interests of Pennsylvania on October 30, 1783. RECONSIDERATION OF
PENNSYLVANIA’S REQUEST TO TREAT FOR PURCHASE OF INDIAN LANDS, supra note 173, at
764–65.
175 DEBATES ON NEW YORK’S RELATIONS WITH THE INDIANS (Oct. 3, 1783), reprinted
in 25 J.C.C., supra note 78, at 639, 642–43.
176 REPORT ON INDIAN AFFAIRS IN THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT (Aug. 3, 1787), reprinted in 33 J.C.C., supra note 89, at 455, 457; see also FRANCIS G. HUTCHINS, TRIBES
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 55 (2000).
177 TREATY BETWEEN THE CREEKS AND THE STATE OF GEORGIA (Nov. 12, 1785), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 17, 17 (Washington, Gales and
Seaton 1832); see also REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS IN THE SOUTHERN
DEPARTMENT, supra note 89, at 457.
178 Among Natelson’s other historical errors, he claims that the Indian Commerce
Clause preserved concurrent state power (when such was affirmatively rejected by the
last Great Committee) and that Madison’s Indian affairs proposal was rejected by the
entire Convention (when it was reviewed and amended only by the five-member Committee of Detail). See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
179 Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1038–45 (2014).
180 Blackhawk, supra note 26, at 1807–08.
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play out the diplomatic vision of the “Savage Constitution”—
such as recognition of native tribes as sovereign by Chief Justice
Marshall and the empowerment of tribes to self-govern under
the Indian Reorganization Act—in the canon, 181 and grounds “war
powers doctrine [ ] in the Indian Wars” in the “anticanon.” 182
Yet while the controversy between centralized and localized
power to treat with Natives is important in understanding the
broad arc of Indian affairs, it can also prove distracting. Focusing on the intense disputes over federal-state power to treat
with tribes has distracted scholars away from the puzzle of the
missing clause in their attempts to explain the incoherence of
Native American law, pitting tribal sovereignty, unanimously
recognized, against the majority position of congressional plenary power. As will be seen, it also distracted the Framers when
attempting to fix the Committee of Detail’s oversight, and perhaps rendered them reluctant to address the initial scrivener’s
error head-on.
***
For all of the flailing, scholars are failing to pinpoint the
true cause of confusion. Each Indian affairs scholar highlights
certain periods of history to justify their philosophy and findings
regarding plenary power, yet none has made sense of it as a
whole and sought to explain its glaring inconsistencies. In contrast to the long prehistory of federal Indian affairs regulation
and grant of explicit power via the Articles, no corollary power is
found in any discrete text of the Constitution. Though the U.S.
Constitution was ostensibly designed to enlarge and empower
the new Congress, in this one unexplained instance, 183 the totality of federal powers shrank. No scholar has yet sought to synthesize and explain this historical puzzle.
Additionally, the efforts to find an alternative textual hook
for plenary power and originalist backstepping demonstrate
near consensus with the Kagama Court: situating plenary power
in the Indian Commerce Clause strains credulity. 184 This strain
Id. at 1863.
Id. at 1829.
183 The one exception that proves the rule of this statement is that Congress was
stripped of its power to requisition the states for money, which proved highly unworkable under the Articles. See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United
States (April 1787), FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://perma.cc/HWE7-XSP2.
184 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378–79.
181
182
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is exacerbated by the even higher stakes placed on the meaning
of “commerce” in the interstate and international arenas. For, as
Prakash has sought to demonstrate, the “presumption of intrasentence uniformity” means that the connotation of one portion of the Commerce Clause should translate into legal content
for the other portions. 185 Here, if Indian commerce means Indian
trade, applying the presumption would dictate that Congress
could only regulate interstate and international trade, undermining entire swaths of federal regulation from Gibbons v.
Ogden 186 to the present day. 187
Resolution of the confused state of Indian affairs jurisprudence and federal policy regarding plenary power is clarified
through a correct diagnosis of the historical puzzle. Although
talented legal minds have talked around it, hinted at it, nudged
it, and nearly bumped into it, none thus far has been able to recognize the true cause of woe bedeviling the practice and legal
justification for federal plenary power. The historical lurching
and disjuncture between practice and text (and the ensuing two
centuries of confusion) stems from a simple, significant oversight made in the bowels of the Constitutional Convention’s
Committee of Detail, to which this Article now turns.
II. THE MISSING CLAUSE
Indian affairs should be a congressional power listed separately in Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. Though both Indian
affairs and trade had long preconstitutional pedigrees and were
unanimously required for inclusion by the Convention, the
Committee of Detail left them out by mistake, and the Convention
thereafter deigned to restore only the power over Indian trade
by inserting tribes in the Commerce Clause, but this time intentionally determined to omit the Indian affairs power. The initial
erratum came about through the misfeasance of more than one
hand. Initially, Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph erroneously left out the clause in his sketch of the Constitution. 188

185 See generally Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149 (2003); see also Speed, supra
note 24, at 485–90 (applying a limited reading of the Indian Commerce Clause to the Interstate Commerce Clause).
186 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
187 Id. at 189–90 (interpreting the Commerce Clause for the first time and holding
that it embraces trade, intercourse, and navigation).
188 See infra figs.1–2 (images of page 5 of Randolph’s sketch).
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Thereafter, Committee of Detail Chair and South Carolinian
John Rutledge scrawled “Indian Affairs” into the margin of
Randolph’s sketch before James Wilson was tasked with producing a completed draft. The conscientious Wilson checked off the
power as was his habit when working through elements of draft
documents, 189 but simply missed including “Indian Affairs” in his
final draft of the Constitution. 190
Until now, no historian has caught the omission. The reasons are many, but, in part, the omission has eluded historians
because Wilson’s check marks were inappropriately attributed
to Rutledge until 2011, 191 and published transcriptions of the
document excluded the check marks until that time. 192 Even
then, binding tape on the left side of the paper obscured the particular check marks next to “Indian Affairs.” 193 It was only in
preparation for this Article that William Meigs’s facsimile of
Randolph’s sketch (produced in 1899 before binding tape was
added), compared to 2019 forensic imaging by the Library of
Congress of the page on which Rutledge’s “Indian Affairs” appears, confirmed that Wilson checked off this congressional
power as he did other powers. 194 As newly published, analyzed,
and demonstrated below, Rutledge’s marginalia was not a “proposal” or “suggestion” affirmatively rejected by the Committee of

189 William Ewald & Lorianne Updike Toler, Committee of Detail Documents, 135
PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 239, 263, 272–73 (2011); William Ewald, The Committee of
Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 217 n.51 (2012). That the check marks are Wilson’s
can be ascertained by reviewing several other Wilson papers at the Historical Society of
Pennsylvania. Specifically, identical check marks can be found in Volume 2 of the Wilson
Papers. See generally Wilson Papers v.2, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (on file with
author).
190 See COMMITTEE OF DETAIL DOCUMENT IX, reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note
140, at 163, 163–75; Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189, at 321–65.
191 Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189, at 263, 272–73; cf. COMMITTEE OF DETAIL
DOCUMENT IV, reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 137, 137 n.6 (failing to mention the check marks, only noting that the document “is in the handwriting of Edmund
Randolph with emendations by John Rutledge”). A facsimile of the Randolph sketch was
published by William Meigs in 1899, Scans I–IX, in WILLIAM M. MEIGS, GROWTH OF THE
CONSTITUTION (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Company 1899), following p.316, but this
publication was quickly overshadowed by the publication of Professor Max Farrand’s
comprehensive transcriptions of Convention documents in 1911, which excluded the
check marks in his transcription and notes.
192 Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189, at 263–85.
193 Id. at 272–73; cf. infra figs.1–2 (image of page 5 of Randolph’s sketch).
194 Scan V, in MEIGS, supra note 191, following p.316.
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Detail, 195 but a command that was inadvertently missed by Wilson, who was personally motivated to comply with the directive. 196
Later, when flagged by Madison, the Committee of Detail
determined, now fully cognizant of the oversight, to reinstate the
power over Indian trade by inserting tribes into the Commerce
Clause. 197 However, this time the Committee intentionally omitted the Indian Affairs Clause, likely because of several factors—
the lateness of the hour, the contentiousness of the underlying
issues, and new reports of border skirmishes. The Committee
punted, leaving it to later generations to work out the nettlesome issue as it did with the slavery question. The missing
clause was never addressed by the Convention as a whole, and
was passed over by the ratifiers.
A.

Committee of Detail Documents

The Committee of Detail’s formation was the point in the
Convention when political machinations transformed into a first
working draft of the Constitution. 198 The carefully selected fivemember committee was tasked with adding “details” to the
Convention’s work up to that point: twenty-four rough resolutions based on the Virginia Plan. 199 For this, the Convention
halted for ten days between July 26 and August 6, 1787. 200 There
are nine extant documents from the Committee of Detail, eight
of which appear in James Wilson’s hand, and one in Virginia
Governor Edmund Randolph’s hand. 201 As discussed above,
while a facsimile of the document in Randolph’s hand was published in 1899 by William Meigs, 202 the entire collection of documents was not transcribed and published until 1911 by Professor Max Farrand and retranscribed by myself and Professor
William Ewald (and published together with document images)
in 2011. 203
195 Natelson, supra note 24, at 236 (“During committee deliberations, Rutledge
suggested incorporating an Indian affairs power. . . . The panel’s failure to include [an
Indian Affairs Clause] may have been an oversight, although this seems unlikely because of the Rutledge proposal.”).
196 See infra Part II.B.3.
197 See infra Part II.C.
198 See generally Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189; Ewald, supra note 189.
199 COMMITTEE OF DETAIL DOCUMENT I, supra note 140, at 129–37.
200 Madison’s Notes (July 26, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 116, 128.
201 See generally Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189.
202 Scans I–IX, MEIGS, supra note 191, following p.316.
203 See generally Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189.
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Two early Committee of Detail documents refer to “Indian
Affairs,” though it is implicated by at least two others. The first
document in the set is James Wilson’s copy of the twenty-four
amended Virginia Plan resolutions referred to the Committee on
July 23, 1787. 204 Relevant to this inquiry is Resolution VI of the
Virginia Plan as originally proposed by Edmund Randolph on
the first day of the Convention’s substantive business, May 29,
1787. 205 It proposed “that the National Legislature ought to be
impowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by
the Confederation.” 206 As anyone would have known (especially
Convention delegates, many of whom had been or were concurrently serving in Congress 207), these “Legislative Rights” under
the Articles of Confederation included “regulating the trade and
managing all affairs with the Indians” from Article IX, and thus
required that both Indian trade and affairs appear in a draft
text. 208 Though Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan was significantly amended on July 17, 209 this provision of the resolution
remained uncontroversial, having passed unanimously without
debate on July 16. 210 The language remained intact until the
resolution was referred to the Committee of Detail on July 23,
appearing as Resolution 8.2. 211
The third document in the set appears to be James Wilson’s
outline of the plan proposed by South Carolina delegate Charles
Pinckney on May 29, 1787, the day the Virginia Plan was proposed. 212 Even though not discussed for over two months (or at
all), it too was referred to the Committee of Detail with the
Virginia resolutions (along with the Patterson Plan, a complete copy of which is not found among Wilson’s Papers). 213
204 Madison’s Notes (July 23, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 84,
95. Per motions from July 25, 1787, all Committee members were permitted to take
down a copy of the resolutions (but no other Convention members). Madison’s Notes
(July 25, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 108, 115.
205 Madison’s Notes (May 29, 1787), reprinted in 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION of 1787, at 20, 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 1 FARRAND].
206 Id.
207 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
208 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, ¶ 4.
209 Madison’s Notes (July 17, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 21,
25–27. For a discussion of amending the resolution, see BALKIN, supra note 23, at 144–45.
210 Madison’s Notes (July 16, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at
15, 16–17.
211 COMMITTEE OF DETAIL DOCUMENT I, supra note 140, at 131.
212 Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189, at 249.
213 Id.; Madison’s Notes (July 26, 1787), supra note 200, at 128. Natelson asserts
that the Committee “likely” had a copy of John Dickinson’s draft of a Constitution,
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The document’s brief listing of Congressional powers includes
“the exclusive Power of regulating Trade and levying Imposts,”
without any mention of Indian affairs. 214
The next document, Randolph’s sketch of the Constitution, 215 is the second to cover Indian affairs within the series and
the first wherein “Indian Affairs,” without more, can be seen,
scrawled in the margin by Rutledge, the Committee’s chair, 216
next to the power to provide punishment for “offences against
the law of nations.” 217 Importantly, “Indian Affairs” does not
seem connected to “Commerce” at this point of the drafting,
which appears earlier on the page. To more effectively convey
the workings of the Committee, three images follow of the page
where “Indian Affairs” appears: Figure 1, a high-resolution image with the binding tape provided by the Library of Congress; 218
Figure 2, an image of Meigs’s facsimile from 1899 without binding tape; and Figure 3, a transcription of the same.

Natelson, supra note 24, at 236, but as it was never proposed in Convention, it could not
have been officially referred, as the Virginia, Patterson, and Pinckney Plans were. James
Hutson transcribed and printed two Dickinson drafts in his bicentennial supplement to
Farrand’s Records. John Lansing, Notes on Debates, reprinted in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX
FARRAND’S RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 82, 84–91 (James H.
Hutson & Leonard Rapport eds., 1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT].
214 Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189, at 257.
215 Although first called a “draft” by Meigs when he published the facsimile of the
document in 1899, MEIGS, supra note 191, at 10, and more recently a “draft” by Ewald,
supra note 189 at 220, I purposefully opt for the language of “sketch” over “draft” for the
document in Randolph’s hand. James Hutson, an early U.S. historian who served as
chief of the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress and in whose care this document was preserved for more than four decades, called the document a “Draft Sketch”
when he included a transcript of it in his Supplement. SUPPLEMENT, supra note 213, at
183. Though nine pages in length and important for its innovations, it is not in prose
format nor does it provide much text in draft format. Instead, it combines notes about
what the text should contain and basic constitution-writing principles, along with lists
and outlines for various sections of a constitution. A “draft” of a document is normally
thought to be an early stage of a completed document, with language that can be edited,
even heavily, but nevertheless used in some format in a final document. Such a document this is not. Important though it is, it is a first sketch of the Constitution, not a first
draft.
216 See Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189, at 263.
217 Id. at 272–73.
218 Image provided courtesy of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. George
Mason’s Papers, Misc. Letters, 1763–1791 (July 24–26, 1787), at 23d.
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FIGURE 3 219

219 I note that this transcription as published in the Pennsylvania Magazine of History
and Biography’s 2011 special centenary edition of Farrand’s Records was printed there
without check marks next to “Indian Affairs” and “to Regulate the Weights & Measures,”
but comparison to the facsimile of the document published by Meigs in 1899 reveals that
the check marks were indeed there, later hidden by binding tape as currently pictured in
Figure 1. Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189, at 273; cf. Scan V, MEIGS, supra note
191, following p.316. The Conservation Department at the Library of Congress has taken
forensic images and confirmed the existence of the check marks beneath the binding
tape, and will remove the binding tape in time.
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One can see here in the transcription the main text in
Randolph’s hand, emendations by Rutledge in red, and the
check marks made by James Wilson as he later combed through
the document in compiling his drafts. 220 We will come back to
this working method later.
The next document where one would expect to find any of the
two “Indian” powers is Wilson’s first full draft of the Constitution.
However, the folio page where all of the powers of Congress
would have been mentioned is missing. 221 Whether this page was
lost whilst the Committee of Detail sat or at a later stage when
Wilson organized his papers, Wilson here substituted excerpts
he copied from the Patterson and Pinckney Plans in place of the
missing folio. 222 This inserted composite document proposes to
provide Congress with the following powers:
[O]f raising a military Land. Force—of equiping a Navy—of
rating and causing public Taxes to be levied—of regulating
the Trade of the several States as well with foreign Nations
as with each other—of levying Duties upon Imports and Exports—of establishing Post-Offices, and raising a Revenue
from them—of regulating Indian Affairs—of coining Money—fixing the Standard of Weights and Measures—of determining in what Species of Money the public Treasury
shall be supplied. 223
As with Randolph’s sketch plus Rutledge’s marginal note,
the nascent Commerce Clause with its three parts—states, foreign nations, and Indians—are here found in two separate
clauses. Commerce is not even mentioned, but “trade” is specified in relation to states and foreign nations, and “affairs” as
pertaining to Indians. It is important to note that this document
Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189, at 263, 273.
Id. at 295–303, 311–19. As noted above, the Historical Society of Pennsylvania,
where Wilson’s Committee of Detail documents reside, labeled this document “Wilson’s
First Draft of the Constitution” during conservation and preparation for bicentennial
displays. See supra note 219.
222 Lorianne Updike Toler, Addendum, 135 PA MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 367, 370–
74 (2011) (tracing the provenance of the Wilson Papers in the possession of the Historical
Society of Pennsylvania to determine how the current placement of the Committee of
Detail came about and concluding that Wilson himself placed the documents in their
current order, including and particularly Documents VI–VIII). Farrand also evidenced a
belief that the ordering of the documents was intentional: in the explanatory note to
Document VII, Farrand writes that Document VII was “placed” between Documents VI
and VIII. COMMITTEE OF DETAIL DOCUMENT VII, reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note
140, at 157, 157.
223 Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189, at 309 (emphasis added).
220
221
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is not necessarily sequential, as it featured in earlier plans submitted to the Convention and was merely copied by Wilson. 224
When the middle portion of the draft document was lost, Wilson
presumably placed the excerpts from the Patterson and Pinckney
Plans there to show what he drew upon in creating the lost section of his draft.
Document IX, Wilson’s second draft of the Constitution and
the final document in the Committee of Detail series, looks most
like our final Constitution and identifies congressional powers in
more recognizable ways. Notably, Indian affairs was entirely left
out of the document:
8
The Legislature of the United
States shall have the Right and Power
^with foreign Nations & amongst the to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Several States; to establish an uniform Imposts and Excises; to regulate
Rule for Naturalization throughout the Naturalization and Commerce; ^ to coin
United States
Money; to regulate the Alloy and Value
foreign of Coin; to fix the Standard of Weights
and Measures; to establish PostOffices; to borrow Money, and emit
Bills on the Credit of the United
States; to appoint a Treasurer by Ballot;
to constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme national Court; to make Rules
concerning Captures on Land or
Water; to declare the Law and
Punishment of Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas, and the
the
Punishment of counterfeiting ^ Coin, and
of the U.S & — of Offences against the Law of Nations;
.

The text in black is in Wilson’s hand, whereas the text in
red is in Rutledge’s. After incorporating all of the edits to the
document, the draft was published for internal circulation and
reported out of committee. 225 Though he caught the omission the
first time, Rutledge missed it the second time around, and the
draft Constitution submitted to the Convention did not include
See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
To view the final Committee of Detail report published for internal circulation,
see Madison’s Notes (Aug. 6, 1787), 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 177, 177–89.
224
225
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“Indian Affairs” or “Indian Trade” as required by the Virginia
Plan resolutions.
From these documents, we see that the Committee of Detail
was compelled to incorporate Indian trade and Indian affairs as
part of the “Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the
Confederation.” 226 However, neither was included in the initial
sketch of the Constitution by Randolph.227 This was not Randolph’s
only mistake: for instance, Randolph set the minimum age for
senators as 25, though the Convention had approved a minimum
age of 30.228 As Ewald points out, this was clear error, as Randolph
partook of the Aristotelian view that an ideal Senate would be
“august,” and thus would have preferred the older minimum age
as required by the Convention. 229 This error was later corrected, 230
as John Rutledge attempted to do for the “Indian Affairs” omission. Rutledge inserted “Indian Affairs” (and other missing congressional powers) into the margins of Randolph’s sketch. 231
Though it may have been included in the missing middle section
of his first draft and lost even while working on it, Wilson then
failed to include either “Indian Affairs” or “Indian Trade” in his
final draft. Despite having Rutledge’s marginal note and the excerpts from the Patterson and Pinckney Plans to draw from (and
the powers listed in the Articles of Confederation, which Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan required to be incorporated 232) in
writing his final draft, Wilson very clearly missed “Indian Affairs.”
B.

Wilson’s Mistake

That such was a mistake and not an intentional omission is
buttressed by three historical factors: (1) the remit, structure,
and working method of the Committee of Detail, (2) Wilson’s
check marks, and (3) Wilson’s personal history and interest in
lodging power over Indian affairs in the central government.
Each will be addressed in turn.

226 Madison’s Notes (May 29, 1787), supra note 205, at 21; COMMITTEE OF DETAIL
DOCUMENT I, supra note 140, at 131.
227 See supra figs.1–2 (images of page 5 of Randolph’s sketch).
228 Ewald, supra note 189, at 227 n.78.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 See Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189, at 263–85.
232 See supra notes 205–07 and accompanying text.
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1. Remit, structure, and working method of the Committee
of Detail.
First, let us consider the charge, structure, and method of
the Committee of Detail. As outlined above, the Committee of
Detail was commissioned by the Convention to “prepare & report the Constitution,” 233 not from whole cloth, but from nine
weeks’ worth of work, a period of time that had witnessed the
near complete dissolution of the Convention and the country’s
hope for a workable Constitution over both representation in the
Senate and the slave question. The gridlock had finally been
broken over representation on July 16, and thus the memory of
the rancorous debate was still fresh in the minds of Committee
members when they convened on July 26, just over a week later. 234
Indeed, on the eve of the Convention’s ten-day recess for the
Committee of Detail’s work, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney “reminded the Convention that if the Committee should fail to insert some security to the Southern States agst. an emancipation
of slaves, and taxes on exports, he shd. be bound by duty to his
State to vote agst. their Report.” 235 They were not there to invent
a constitution but, as the uncontroversial name of the Committee
dictated, to provide “Detail.” 236 Their commission in the form of
the twenty-four resolutions referred to them by the Convention
was thus paramount. If they strayed too far, they knew that the
risk of dissolution was all too real. Possibly the most uncontroversial requirement of the Convention was found in Resolution 8.2:
the requirement to incorporate the congressional powers enjoyed
under the Articles of Confederation, including the power over
Madison’s Notes (July 26, 1787), supra note 200, at 128.
Madison’s Notes (July 16, 1787), supra note 210, at 15–16. Emotions ran so high,
and the large states were so aghast at the small states’ unexpected win, that, after the
vote affording states equal representation in the Senate, when Edmund Randolph proposed to adjourn “that the large States might consider the steps proper to be taken in the
present solemn crisis of the business, and that the small States might also deliberate on
the means of conciliation,” William Patterson, from the small state of New Jersey, urged
Randolph to “reduce to form his motion for an adjournment sine die,” disbanding the
Convention. Id. at 17–18.
235 Madison’s Notes (July 23, 1787), supra note 204, at 95 (citation omitted).
236 See Washington’s Diary (July 27, 1787), reprinted in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65, 65 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 3 FARRAND]:
233
234

In Convention, which adjourned this day, to meet again on Monday the 6th. of
August that a Comee. which had been appointed (consisting of 5 Members)
might have time to arrange, and draw into method & form the several matters
which had been agreed to by the Convention, as a Constitution for the United
States.
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Indian trade and affairs. 237 That it was uncontroversial made it
no less important, though perhaps not as fresh in their minds as
the vivid scenes of heated debate that threatened dissolution.
Despite that they might personally disagree with one or more
provisions (and did), Randolph or Wilson would not have intentionally disregarded such directives. 238
The structure of the Committee and Wilson’s relationship to
the “Indian Affairs” marginalia’s author also underscores his
oversight. As mentioned above, the Committee was chaired by
John Rutledge. 239 This is nowhere specified in the records of the
Constitutional Convention, yet such attribution is based upon
convention and common practice of the age. 240 As seen throughout the Journal of the Continental Congress, it was standard
practice to list committee chairs first when they were chosen by
voice vote, as Rutledge was, and then for these individuals to
report for the committee, as Rutledge did. 241 Committee reports
were usually in the hand of the chair, 242 and Rutledge’s chairmanship is confirmed by edits in his hand upon documents authored by two members, Randolph and Wilson. 243 That Rutledge
was the Committee’s chair meant his edits and marginal notes
carried special weight. The “Indian Affairs” marginal edit was
not, as indicated by Natelson, a “suggestion” or “proposal” that

COMMITTEE OF DETAIL DOCUMENT I, supra note 140, at 131–32.
Ewald, supra note 189, at 228, 232–35 (identifying that Wilson disagreed with
giving the Senate any powers over foreign affairs and any supermajority requirements,
and that Randolph disagreed with the prohibition on restricting the slave trade and a
solitary executive).
239 See generally Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189. See also text accompanying
note 216.
240 Ewald, supra note 189, at 249 (“It is often said that Rutledge served as the
Committee’s chairman, but the evidence is not conclusive.”).
241 See, e.g., REPORT ON PENNSYLVANIA’S PEACE WITH THE INDIANS (Apr. 21, 1783),
reprinted in 24 J.C.C., supra note 171, at 264, 264 (identifying Alexander Hamilton as a
committee chair); REPORT ON A BALANCE OWED TO THOMAS EDISON (Apr. 22, 1783), reprinted in 24 J.C.C., supra note 171, at 265, 265 (identifying Daniel Carroll as a committee chair); see also Madison’s Notes (July 24, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note
140, at 99, 106 (listing Rutledge first among members of his committee); Madison’s Notes
(Aug. 6, 1787), supra note 225, at 177 (noting that Rutledge delivered his committee’s
report).
242 See, e.g., REPORT ON PENNSYLVANIA’S PEACE WITH THE INDIANS, supra note 241,
at 264 n.1 (identifying a committee report as “in the writing of Alexander Hamilton”).
243 Ewald, supra note 189, at 244 (“[Rutledge’s] handwriting appears on the Randolph
draft and on the last of the Wilson drafts; this is compatible with his having presided over
Committee meetings in which the drafts were discussed.”); see Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189, at 263–85, 321–65.
237
238
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was affirmatively rejected by Wilson. 244 Instead, it was a directive or, more simply, a command by a superior that created a
duty Wilson would have been remiss to ignore. Wilson did not
ignore other such edits by Rutledge, 245 and it would be highly
unlikely that he would have altered course for this uncontroversial congressional power.
The working method of the Committee of Detail, as made
evident through the extant documents, also confirms Wilson’s
mistake. For reasons beyond the scope of this Article, the
Committee of Detail has been underdiscussed and undertheorized in the literature of the Constitutional Convention. 246 Thus,
few have analyzed the workflow of the Committee as suggested
in the documents, and some fairly commonsense observations
have heretofore been missed. To begin, committees are universally multimember bodies that meet to discuss one or more proposals. This must have been true of the Committee of Detail; its
members would have met together, most likely more than once,
to discuss the Convention’s proposals and to review internal
work. Additionally, as it is difficult to coherently write anything
in a crowd, individual Committee members would likely have
worked on their own. Thus, there would have been times when
the Committee worked in concert and times when members
worked in secluded cloisters. Though they feasibly could have
met in smaller subcommittees, 247 given the already intimate nature of the five-member committee, this is unlikely.
Overlaying these common attributes of committees (both of
committees generally and this particular committee) onto the
extant documents, 248 the workflow of the Committee and its

Natelson, supra note 24, at 236.
In addition to directing Wilson to add Indian affairs as a congressional power,
Rutledge’s notes to include power to regulate weights and measures, to borrow money,
and to enforce treaties were all incorporated by Wilson. See Ewald, supra note 189, at
229; cf. Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189, at 338–41.
246 For more on the topic, see generally William Ewald & Lorianne Updike Toler,
Early Drafts of the U.S. Constitution, 135 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 227 (2011). See
also Ewald, supra note 189, at 201–02.
247 But see Ewald’s suggestion that Randolph and Rutledge worked together separate from the Committee. Ewald, supra note 189, at 244.
248 We know that at least a portion of Wilson’s first draft is missing, but there must
be other missing documents. For instance, the Convention approved each Committee
member to have his own copy of the Convention’s resolutions, so there likely would have
been copies of the resolutions in each Committee member’s hand. Madison’s Notes (July
25, 1787), supra note 204, at 115. There were likely also other documents in Gorham and
Ellsworth’s and possibly Rutledge’s hand that have since been lost to history. See Ewald,
244
245
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implications for the missing Indian Affairs Clause comes into
sharper focus. Of the nine Committee of Detail documents, those
that would most likely be the product (or show the markings) of
group discussions or meetings would logically be those with the
imprints of multiple members. Here, those documents include
Document IV (Randolph’s sketch with Rutledge’s emendations
and Wilson’s check marks), and Document IX (Wilson’s second
draft, again with Rutledge’s emendations). The likelihood that
these documents witnessed or were partial products of group
discussion is underscored by the presence of “agrd” twice
scrawled by Rutledge next to the tax power and the prohibition
on export taxes on page five of Randolph’s sketch. 249 That contemporaneous committee reports from the Continental Congress
were normally found in the handwriting of the chair 250 indicates
that, as a matter of course, committee chairs would preside over
committee meetings with quill in hand. As he had many times
before for committees he chaired in the Continental Congress, 251
Rutledge indeed presided over the Committee of Detail sessions
with quill in hand, and evidence of these sessions is found in the
many emendations he made to Randolph’s initial sketch and
Wilson’s final draft (both likely prepared alone on assignment
from the Committee 252). These were not Rutledge’s personal edits
supra note 189, at 203–04 (referencing the “loose scraps of paper” that William Jackson,
secretary of the Convention, burned in a fire after the Convention adjourned sine die).
249 See supra figs.1–2 (images of page 5 of Randolph’s sketch). Although Ewald hints
that “agrd” next to the import prohibition favored by the deep South could indicate Randolph and Rutledge working to the exclusion of the rest of the Committee, Ewald, supra
note 189, at 231, 244, this is unlikely, as the same also appears next to the tax provision,
which was not necessarily favored by the deep South.
250 See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
251 See, e.g., DEBATES ON MEANS OF OBTAINING FUNDS FROM THE STATES (Feb. 11,
1783), reprinted in 24 J.C.C., supra note 171, at 124, 124 (identifying Rutledge as the
first selected of a committee of three); REPORT ON MEANS OF OBTAINING FUNDS FROM THE
STATES (Feb. 17, 1783), reprinted in 24 J.C.C., supra note 171, at 133, 135 n.1 (identifying the Committee’s report as being in his hand).
252 Ewald presents compelling evidence that Randolph worked alone in preparing
his sketch. Ewald, supra note 189, at 242–44. Strongest among these proofs is the word
“I” in the last sentence of the sketch, id. at 242, and that Randolph was absent from plenary discussions after his appointment to the Committee. Madison’s Notes (July 26,
1787), supra note 200, at 121 (“Mr. Randolph happened to be out of the House.”). Similarly, Wilson’s copy of Convention Resolutions adopted up until July 24—what Farrand
labels as Document I—was likely the only copy (the Convention not having quite yet approved individual copies for Committee members, which would not come until July 25).
Madison’s Notes (July 25, 1787), supra note 204, at 115. It is likely this document was
prepared by Wilson working alone in anticipation of a first Committee session after the
five members were “ballot[ed]” on July 24 but before the Convention broke on July
26, as it did not include resolutions from those days (and Farrand had to reconstruct
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(though he certainly had great influence, especially upon the
“deep South” provisions 253), but reflected committee discussions
and agreements in accord with standard forms of parliamentary
procedure. 254 For the instant inquiry, this standard working
method translated into Indian affairs taking on the imprimatur
not just of Rutledge in his personal capacity, but Rutledge acting
as the Committee chair, as the product of Committee discussion
and, likely, a Committee vote.
Humble though the marginalia may appear, when analyzed
within the Committee of Detail’s probable workflow as reflected
by extant documents and dictated by standard committee operating procedures of the time, “Indian Affairs” had the weight of
the Committee of Detail behind it, and such a command compelled a duty in the Committee member tasked with the next
stage of drafting: James Wilson. He would have been untoward
to shrug off this duty, and he appears at least initially to have
complied, as evidenced by the check mark appearing next to
“Indian Affairs,” discussed next.

Convention resolutions from those days to fill the void). 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at
95, 97, 115, 134. There are also no Rutledge emendations on any Wilson Committee of
Detail documents apart from his final draft, indicating that these, too, were prepared
alone. See generally Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189. That Randolph and Wilson
were likely assigned their individual tasks is illustrated by again applying standard
committee procedures for the Convention. At Committee sessions, standard committee
rules of procedure would have applied, and work would have been assigned (and all substantive decisions made) by committee vote as it was when the Convention met as a
Committee of the Whole. A first Committee meeting is not precluded by Randolph’s working before the Convention broke. As was true for all committees except the Committee of
Detail, the Convention did not break from their grueling, daily ten-to-five schedule, excepting Sundays, until they adjourned sine die. The Committee of Detail could and likely did
meet after or before hours immediately upon being impaneled by the Convention on July
24, and then gave Randolph his assignment. Wilson was given his assignment after
Randolph reported and his sketch was discussed and worked through via normal committee parliamentary procedure.
253 For further discussion, see Ewald, supra note 189, at 231, 244. After all, it was
Rutledge’s fellow South Carolinian delegate who had threatened boycotting the Convention
if slavery were not protected days before. See supra text accompanying note 235.
254 See generally JOHN HATSELL, PRECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS; WITH OBSERVATIONS (1776–1796). That Hatsell predominated in promulgating rules of parliamentary procedure in the fledgling United States is confirmed by
Thomas Jefferson, who compiled a parliamentary procedure manual for the Senate as its
president during his vice presidency, published in 1801. In his preface, he writes, “I
could not doubt the necessity of quoting the sources of my information, among which Mr.
Hatsel’s [sic] most valuable book is preeminent.” JEFFERSON’S MANUAL OF
PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, reprinted in CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL AND
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 105, 105 n.a (Lewis
Deschler ed., 1941).
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2. Wilson’s check marks.
Wilson’s mistake is also laid bare by the breadcrumb trail
he left in his check marks. A classic Wilson working method
found in many of his other papers was to review earlier material
for inclusion in later material and check items off, much the way
a modern task list would be checked off. 255 Check marks appear
on the Randolph Sketch for other powers, including one next to
Rutledge’s “Indian Affairs” in the margin. 256 The presence of the
check mark here and the omission of the Clause in Wilson’s final
draft is curious. If checked off, consistent with Wilson’s working
method, the congressional power would presumably be found in
the next document. Yet the section on congressional powers that
would have included “Indian Affairs” in the next document is
missing.
It might be tempting to explain the omission by postulating
that Wilson included “Indian Affairs” in accord with his check
mark in Randolph’s sketch in this first draft, but then the
Clause was rejected by the Committee in full session. However,
such is improbable if not impossible for at least three reasons.
First, the Convention’s instruction to the Committee to include
the Clause, as found in the unanimous July 16 vote on Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan to include “the Legislative Rights
vested in Congs. by the Confederation” and the long prehistory
of “Indian Trade and Affairs” regulation by Congress that antedated it, were uncontroversial. 257 Second, as shown above,
Rutledge’s directive to include “Indian Affairs” was almost certainly a Committee decision, and reversals of this kind were not
otherwise found in the Committee’s work. 258 Third, no Rutledge
emendations were found on Wilson’s first draft, which points to
this not being a document reviewed by the full Committee. More
likely, Wilson either transposed the Committee’s requirements
into a separate list no longer extant and then missed “Indian
Affairs” when composing his first draft, or included “Indian
Affairs” in the first draft and missed including it in the second.
255 See Wilson Papers, supra note 189; Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 189, at
263 (attributing the check marks to James Wilson based on a comparison of his check
marks on many Wilson manuscripts).
256 See supra note 219.
257 For the unanimous vote, see Madison’s Notes (July 16, 1787), supra note 210, at
16–17. For the prehistory of Indian affairs, see supra Part I.A. Though the federal split
of power over Indian affairs was controversial, see supra note 159 and accompanying
text, that Congress had some power over Indian affairs was not.
258 See supra note 254.
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Of the two options, the latter is more probable, as the document
elected to fill the void, the composite of Patterson and Pinckney
Plans, included the Legislative power “of regulating Indian
Affairs.” 259 It is also possible that Wilson lost the relevant section even while preparing his final draft, which could be one
reason why he missed including “Indian Affairs.”
3. Wilson’s vested interests in a federal Indian affairs
power.
The final historical factor underscoring Wilson’s scrivener’s
error comes from his personal vested interests. As confirmed by
evidence extrinsic to the Committee of Detail, the absence of
“Indian Affairs” in the Constitution ultimately affected Wilson
personally—even, perhaps, fatally. The same day that thenColonel Washington was appointed commander of the revolutionary forces, June 16, 1775, the Continental Congress appointed a committee “relative to Indian affairs” that included
the intrepid Wilson. 260 A month later, Wilson was appointed one
of the first Indian affairs commissioners 261 and, that fall, witnessed one of the first postcolonial treaties being made with the
Six Nations at Fort Pitt. 262 Possibly through this exposure to the
wide-open spaces of tribal territory, Wilson—then a frontier lawyer in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, when not serving in Congress 263—
became seized with a vision of western White settlement, wherein European riches and labor could combine with the vast expanses in the American West. 264
While riding circuit and ostensibly serving as Indian affairs
commissioner and an Indian trade committeeman in the late

COMMITTEE OF DETAIL DOCUMENT VII, supra note 222, at 157, 159.
FORMATION OF A COMMITTEE RELATIVE TO INDIAN AFFAIRS (June 13, 1775), reprinted in 2 J.C.C., supra note 68, at 91, 93.
261 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS (July 12, 1775), reprinted in 2
J.C.C., supra note 68, at 174, 175; ORDER TO PREPARE A PEACE TALK TO INDIAN NATIONS
(July 13, 1775), reprinted in 2 J.C.C., supra note 68, at 177, 183.
262 SMITH, supra note 68, at 69–72.
263 Id. at 43.
264 ON THE IMPROVEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF LANDS IN THE UNITED STATES (CIRCA
MID-1790S), reprinted in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 372, 372–86 (Kermit L.
Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007); Prospectus for an Association for the Promotion of
Immigration from Europe, v.2, and Advertisement for the Sale of Land, Wilson Papers
v.10, f.117, MS, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (on file with author); see also
Heads of a Plan Concerning the New States, Wilson Papers v.2, f.132, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (on file with author).
259
260
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1770s, 265 Wilson began buying up vast tracts of tribal lands,
eventually becoming president of the ill-fated Illinois-Wabash
Company. 266 Congress later indirectly censured Wilson’s selfdealing (and did not reappoint him as an Indian affairs commissioner). 267 The weight of western land debt ultimately proved his
political downfall and contributed to his untimely death. 268 To
his credit, Wilson abstained from compounding his self-dealing
by absenting himself not only from the committee making recommendations on Virginia’s western land cessions—to much of
which he, through the Illinois-Wabash Company, also had
claim—but also from congressional discussions and votes on the
same. 269 However, in July 1776, John Adams noted that, as a

265 A new Indian trade committee was established on November 23, 1775, that included Wilson. MOTION TO FORM A COMMITTEE ON TRADE WITH INDIANS (Nov. 23, 1775),
reprinted in 3 J.C.C., supra note 68, at 366.
266 SMITH, supra note 68, at 159–68. After decades attempting to secure good title to
their 60 million acres of land purchased from Natives, the fate of the Illinois-Wabash
Company was finally decided in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823),
wherein the Supreme Court determined that the private purchase of lands directly from
Natives was invalid. Id. at 568; see also Two Land Deeds, Wilson Papers v.3, f.1, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (on file with author); Land Loan Receipts and Payment Receipts, Wilson Papers v.3, f.42, 49 & 52 Historical Society of Pennsylvania (on file with
author); For the Surveyor General, Wilson Papers v.10, f.116, MS, Historical Society of
Pennsylvania (on file with author).
267 RESOLUTION TO FORM A COMMITTEE TO REGULATE TRADE WITH INDIANS (Oct. 15,
1783), reprinted in 25 J.C.C., supra note 78, at 680, 693 (instructing a committee to prepare an ordinance “with a clause therein strictly prohibiting all civil and military officers, and particularly all commissioners and agents for Indian affairs, from trading with
the Indians, or purchasing, or being directly or indirectly concerned in purchasing lands
from Indians”).
268 The Wilson Papers at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania are littered with
promissory notes and land titles purchased by Wilson. See supra note 266. His chief biographer attributed President Washington’s denying Wilson the chief judgeship on the
Supreme Court, despite his superior legal resume, to the embarrassment of his great
land debt. SMITH, supra note 68, at 373. Wilson was not the only founder who speculated
in western land, with President Washington and Robert Morris being first among the
nation’s landholders, but he was likely the most indebted. See id. at 160, 163, 168.
Though his tracts later became “among the most valuable in America,” id. at 402 n.11,
Wilson’s immediate financial woes in the later 1790s caused him to run from creditors
while still serving on the Supreme Court and become ensconced in Edmonton, South
Carolina, where he contracted malaria. Id. at 386. Although he seemed to recover, he
rallied only to attempt to settle his land debts, from which he refused to retract in the
interest of his creditors. Id. at 388. He then relapsed, suffered a stroke, and, in the feverish state leading up to his death, railed about his debts while his second wife, Hannah,
looked on helplessly. Id.
269 Wilson was initially assigned to the committee “to whom was referred a motion
. . . for accepting the cession of territory” by Virginia. REPORT ON THE CESSION OF
TERRITORY BY THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE, supra note 171, at 381. The seventh section of
this motion stipulated that
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Pennsylvania Congressman, Wilson “argued eloquently for exclusive congressional jurisdiction over all Indian affairs.” 270 Unfortunately, as Natelson writes, Wilson lost the point. 271 As a
congressman, Wilson voted to maintain federal power to treat
with Native tribes and control land sales even in preference to
his home state of Pennsylvania. 272 He voted against every state
attempt to individually treat with tribes, and not just when his
contested titles were implicated. 273 Wilson favored congressional
control of western territory and its ability to directly treat with
Native tribes. 274 As later proved by his failed petition to Congress
all purchase and deeds from any Indian or Indians, or from any Indian nation
or nations, for any lands within any part of the said territory which have been
or should be made for the use or benefit of any private person or persons whatsoever, and royal grants within the ceded territory, inconsistent with the chartered rights, law and customs of Virginia, should be deemed and declared absolutely void and of no effect.
REPORT DETAILING CONDITIONS ON THE CESSION OF TERRITORY BY THE VIRGINIA
LEGISLATURE, supra note 171, at 559, 561–62 (quoting “the act of the legislature of Virginia,
of the 2d of January, 1781”). Wilson was absent and manually removed from the committee on June 20, 1783. REPORT ON THE CESSION OF TERRITORY BY THE VIRGINIA
LEGISLATURE (June 20, 1783), reprinted in 24 J.C.C., supra note 171, at 406, 406.
Though Wilson remained absent and unable to defend his interests, Congress nonetheless accepted the September 13 report of the Committee, headed by John Rutledge, that
recommended against accepting the condition of the seventh section voiding alternative
claims such as Wilson’s, as it would be “improper” for Congress to prejudge such claims.
REPORT DETAILING CONDITIONS ON THE CESSION OF TERRITORY BY THE VIRGINIA
LEGISLATURE, supra note 171, at 562–63. On accepting the report, Congress rejected the
language “as they ought not to prejudge the claims of individuals or others, but ought to
leave them to be determined according to the principles of equity and the Constitution”
as the de jure reason for rejecting the clause. Id. at 563 (alterations omitted).
270 Natelson, supra note 24, at 228; see also Debates (July 26, 1776), reprinted in 6
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 1077–79 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1906).
271 Natelson, supra note 24, at 228.
272 Wilson maintained his position through the 1780s, as evidenced by the April
1783 committee report on which he served recognizing Congress’s “general superintendence of Indian affairs” under the Articles. REPORT ON PENNSYLVANIA’S LETTER
RESPECTING A PEACE WITH THE INDIANS (Apr. 21, 1783), reprinted in 24 J.C.C., supra
note 171, at 262, 264.
273 See, e.g., VOTE ON PENNSYLVANIA’S REQUEST TO TREAT FOR PURCHASE OF INDIAN
LANDS, supra note 173, at 717–19.
274 Wilson’s fixation on land wealth generally and western land in particular extended
to the optimal method for collecting revenues for war debts. Though he ultimately conceded
the point in favor of the infamous Three-Fifths Compromise as a means for measuring
state wealth (and which he later proposed as the basis for taxation and representation
under the Constitution), in order to ensure equal representation in the Senate, Wilson
was the Continental Congress’s primary proponent of maintaining the Articles’ landbased wealth assessment as the basis for state requisitions. See, e.g., VOTE ON MEANS OF
OBTAINING FUNDS FROM THE STATES (Mar. 28, 1783), reprinted in 24 J.C.C., supra note
171, at 214, 214–16; see also Madison’s Notes (June 11, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND,
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on behalf of the Illinois-Wabash company, 275 this was because
Wilson believed the best chances of validating his western
claims lay with his many friends and connections in federal
power. As shown by collective compromises in both the Continental Congress and in the constitutional texts he drafted, 276 he
was also scrupled enough to be ruled by the majority despite
personal differences.
In sum, both the Convention (via its general directive to
incorporate congressional powers found in the Articles) and
Committee Chairman John Rutledge (via his marginal note)
commanded Wilson’s obedience. Wilson would not have taken either command lightly, his check marks evince his unconsummated intention to comply, and his vested interests left him with
a strong preference for federal power over Indian affairs. Wilson’s
oversight in leaving out Indian affairs from the Committee of
Detail’s report was therefore not intentional—at least, not at
this stage of the Constitution’s history.
C.

The Convention’s Partial Resurrection

Wilson’s oversight was noticed. After Wilson’s final draft
was reported out of committee by Rutledge on August 6, 277 the
omission was not mentioned for ten days. However, on August
16, with only a month remaining before the final Constitution
was reported to Congress, Madison proposed to refer to the same
Committee of Detail nine congressional powers, including “[t]o
regulate affairs with the Indians as well within as without the
limits of the U. States.” 278 By this proposal, Madison sought to
correct the Committee of Detail’s oversight and the ambiguous
states’ rights language of the Articles of Confederation that had

supra note 205, at 196, 201; DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787: THE MEN WHO
INVENTED THE CONSTITUTION 75–81 (2007).
275 Report of the Committee to Whom Was Referred, on the 13th Ultimo, the Memorial
of the Illinois and Wabash Land Company, by James Wilson, Their President (House of
Representatives, Feb. 3, 1797), Wilson Papers v.2, f.119, Historical Society of Pennsylvania
(on file with author).
276 See supra note 274; see also Ewald & Updike Toler, supra note 246, at 235–36
(“A careful examination [of Committee of Detail documents and drafts] shows that on
many important questions—especially the provisions concerning slavery, but on others
as well—Wilson was outvoted by his colleagues . . . and may well have found himself in a
minority of one.”).
277 Madison’s Notes (Aug. 6, 1787), supra note 225, at 177.
278 Madison’s Notes (Aug. 18, 1787), reprinted in 2 F ARRAND, supra note 140, at
321, 324–25.
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caused so much trouble. 279 The Committee of Detail rejected
Madison’s language and instead grafted “Indians” into the
Commerce Clause, adding in a clause that partially reflected
the states’ rights language of the Articles. Its updated report of
August 22 indicates that the Committee decided on the following wording of the clause: “[To regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the Several States] and with Indians, within
the Limits of any State, not subject to the laws thereof.” 280 By
whatever hand the change was made, 281 the Committee had
reintroduced some of the ambiguity of the Articles into the
Constitution, and resurrected its “Indian trade” language. It
thereby converted its oversight into a sin of omission and created a new problem: by electing to restore the power over Indian
trade but not affairs, it effectively shrank congressional power
from affairs to merely commerce as respecting tribes.
The Convention did not discuss the provision, nor did it take
any formal action on this latter report, having postponed the
session so members could take down a copy. 282 The language
was instead taken up and amended further by a Committee of
Eleven 283 to deal with “such parts of the Constitution as have
been postponed, and such parts of Reports as have not been acted on, to a Committee of a member from each State,” to which
Madison had finally been appointed (after being overlooked for
the Committee of Detail and the previous two “grand” committees of eleven) on August 31. 284 Reporting on September 4, this
279

See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, ¶ 4:

The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with
the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the legislative
right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated.
This is discussed in note 151 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the nationalstate power struggle, see supra notes 155–66 and accompanying text.
280 Convention Journal (Aug. 22, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at
366, 367. To view the version of the Committee of Detail draft the delegates would have
been working from, see Session 3478, QUILL PROJECT AT PEMBROKE COLL., OXFORD
(Kieran Hazzard, Lauren Davis, Grace Mallon & Nicholas Cole eds., 2019 edition),
https://perma.cc/7PG2-5SY5. This and previous Quill Project–reconstructed drafts of the
Constitutions drive home the point that the Indian Commerce Clause was never approved
as a discrete text, but as part of the very last draft approved on the eve of adjournment.
281 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
282 Madison’s Notes (Aug. 22, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 369, 376.
283 Madison’s Notes (Aug. 18, 1787), supra note 278, at 328.
284 Madison’s Notes (Aug. 31, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 475,
481. The committees of eleven, representing all states attending the Convention in August,
were called “grand.” See, e.g., id. at 480; Madison’s Notes (Aug. 18, 1787), supra note
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committee removed the offensive states’ rights language, but left
power to legislate over Indians saddled to the Commerce
Clause. 285 The Commerce Clause now read, “Congress shall have
power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several States and with the Indian tribes.” 286
The language was never approved as a discrete text, but
was adopted without any comment or debate as part of the nearfinal text of the Constitution on September 10 and referred to
the Committee of Style and Arrangement. 287 Other than varying
the punctuation and capitalization, 288 this final committee made
no edits to the clause, and it was approved as part of the final,
unratified Constitution on September 17, 1787, when the Convention adjourned. As finally approved, the full Commerce
Clause read as follows: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 289
These critical changes to what was once “Indian Affairs”
happened where the record is most sparse: Madison’s notes, traditionally the most reliable source of the Convention, 290 became
quite thin after the Committee of Detail reported for the first
time, and even more sparse after August 22. 291 At this time, Madison was tired,292 sick,293 working around the clock on after-hour
278, at 328. This was in keeping with the practice of the Continental Congress for similar committees comprising a representative from each state. See, e.g., REPORT ON
REDUCING EXPENSES IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT (Apr. 7, 1783), reprinted in 24 J.C.C., supra note 171, at 230, 230 (appointing a “Grand Committee” consisting of one member
from each of the eleven states in attendance).
285 Convention Journal (Sept. 4, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at
493, 493.
286 PROCEEDINGS OF CONVENTION REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE OF STYLE AND
ARRANGEMENT, reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 565, 569; see also Madison’s
Notes (Sept. 4, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 496–97.
287 Madison’s Notes (Sept. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at
557, 564, 569.
288 Madison’s Notes (Sept. 17, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at
641, 655.
289 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
290 See James H. Hutson, Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24 (1986) (“‘[A]t once,’ wrote Farrand, ‘all other records
[apart from Madison’s notes] paled into insignificance.’”).
291 See generally 1 FARRAND, supra note 205; 2 FARRAND, supra note 140.
292 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 82 (1997).
293 MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 141–42 (2015); see also LETTER FROM JAMES MADISON TO THOMAS
JEFFERSON (July 18, 1787), reprinted in 3 FARRAND, supra note 236, at 60; LETTER FROM
JAMES MADISON TO JAMES MCCLURG (Aug. 25, 1787), reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF
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committee assignments, 294 and, likely, depressed. 295 All of this
combined to greatly reduce the volume of his note-taking and
thus the material from which any legal inferences could be made
about the provenance of the Indian Commerce Clause. 296
Despite the lack of conclusive proof from Madison’s notes or
other documents, his background and vocalized concerns make
him the likely antagonist for the correction of the confused
states’ rights language. Madison had been invited by the Marquis
de Lafayette to attend U.S. peace negotiations with the Iroquois
Six Nations in the fall of 1784 at Fort Stanwix, and was not likely
to forget this firsthand experience with Indian affairs. 297 In
preparation for the Convention, he had outlined the flaws of the
Confederation for himself, listing “the wars and Treaties of
Georgia with the Indians” as the prime example of state encroachments on federal authority. 298 It was he who first noticed
the Committee of Detail’s oversight, and it is he who should likely
be credited for spearheading removing the offensive states’
rights language. 299 It disappeared, after all, only once Madison
had been appointed to the final Committee of Eleven that proposed the ultimate text.
And it is he we have to thank for the insertion of “tribes” into the Commerce Clause. Reserving for another time a full discussion of the distinctions between commerce and trade, it is
JAMES MADISON 157, 157–58 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1977) [hereinafter 10 MADISON
PAPERS]; LETTER FROM JAMES MCCLURG TO JAMES MADISON (Sept. 5, 1787), reprinted in
10 MADISON PAPERS, supra, at 162, 162.
294 BILDER, supra note 293, at 142–44.
295 After losing the great contest over representation in the Senate, failing to secure
his pet provision of a national veto over state laws, and being passed over for a seat on
the prestigious Committee of Detail, Madison’s depression can be read between the lines
in his letters to Jefferson in Paris, to whom he candidly communicates his discontent
over the Constitution’s “embarrassment[s].” LETTER FROM JAMES MADISON TO THOMAS
JEFFERSON (Sept. 6, 1787), reprinted in 10 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 293, at 163–64;
LETTER FROM JAMES MADISON TO THOMAS JEFFERSON (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 10
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 293, at 206, 214–15.
296 Even though Farrand included other notes and the official journal in his Records,
a rough page comparison of the first two volumes before and after August 6 reveals the
brevity of Madison’s note-taking during this five-week interval. The number of pages devoted to predraft discussion is 606, compared to 474 pages postdraft. See generally 1
FARRAND, supra note 205; 2 FARRAND, supra note 140. This also despite the fact that
fifty-seven pages of the postdraft space are consumed by further reports and the final
Constitution’s text. 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 176–667.
297 See JAMES R. GAINES, FOR LIBERTY AND GLORY: WASHINGTON, LAFAYETTE, AND
THEIR REVOLUTIONS 202–03 (2007); HUTCHINS, supra note 176, at 45–46.
298 Madison, supra note 183.
299 HUTCHINS, supra note 176, at 69.
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possible to say that commerce is more like trade than it is the
broader connotation of affairs. As has been shown, Indian affairs
sometimes embraced Indian trade and could presumably also
embrace commerce within its capaciousness. Thus as Fletcher
has shown, “Commerce” does not capture all that the preconstitutional “Affairs” entailed. Whereas simply incorporating “Indian
Affairs” (as directed by Rutledge in his marginal note) could have
supplied power over trade, providing for “Indian Commerce” supplied, at most, for no more than half of the powers vis-à-vis
tribes reserved to Congress under the Articles. Thus, including
“Indian Tribes” into the Commerce Clause was, at best, solving
the missing Indian Affairs Clause only in part.
What is to be made of this half resurrection and the unrecorded committee discussions that must have surrounded it? Did
it absolve the Committee of Detail’s former mistake? Did those
few Framers mean to restore power over Indian trade and disdain including Indian affairs, contracting the scope of congressional power in this one regard?
Justice Thomas and at least two legal historians suggest
that the Convention’s limiting of federal Indian authority to
commerce, in the words of Professor Francis Hutchins, “could be
interpreted as sanctioning state power over any and all matters
relating to ‘Indians’ within state bounds other than the narrow
federal power here acknowledged.” 300 For support, one historian
proffers that soon after the Convention, Nathaniel Gorham, one
of the Committee of Detail’s five members, purchased preemption rights to Iroquois lands in New York State from the Bay
State and negotiated a state treaty “acquiring some of these
rights from the Iroquois.” 301 Yet Gorham, though past president
of Congress, was “not much improved in his education” and unlikely to be the intellectual heavyweight among the five-member
committee, which contained political and legal lights Edmund
Randolph, Virginia governor and sponsor of the Virginia Plan;
James Wilson, who “rank[ed] among the foremost in legal and
political knowledge”; John Rutledge, former first governor of
South Carolina and legally trained in England; and Oliver
Ellsworth, a Princeton-trained judge from Connecticut who
shepherded the Great Compromise through the Convention,
winning an equal vote for the small states in the Senate over the

300
301

See id. at 68–69; see also supra note 154and accompanying text.
HUTCHINS, supra note 176, at 69.
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strong objection of the more populous states, and who was
“much respected for his integrity.” 302 Even if Gorham’s later actions were premeditated in the Convention and he actively
sought to limit congressional power over Indians in both resurrecting the unworkable language from the Articles of Confederation
and limiting congressional power over Natives to commerce, it
was unlikely Gorham would have an outsized influence on his
peers, let alone that he would draft any text, as his hand is not
present on any other Committee of Detail documents.
Despite all this, it is also unlikely that Gorham, if he had authored the Committee’s language limiting the Indian Commerce
Clause to Natives “not subject to the laws” of individual states,
meant for it to have the cramped reading attributed it by Justice
Thomas and others. After all, he and two other members of the
Committee of Detail—Ellsworth and Rutledge (the chair)—had
served on the Continental Congress committee that had rejected
Virginia’s limit on their western land cessation, negating alternative claims by individuals (such as Wilson) who had directly purchased land from Native tribes. 303 Rejecting Virginia’s limitation
in this way expanded congressional hegemony over tribal affairs. Gorham may have dissented from this earlier Committee’s
recommendation (and later acted in his own self-interest), but it
is more than likely that he and the other two members of the
Congressional Committee who also served on the Committee of
Detail, plus Wilson, would have, at the very least, seen Madison’s
proposed language as an improvement on the Articles by omitting the obscuring language limiting congressional power over
Indian affairs and trade, “provided that the legislative right of
any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated,” and
providing only a slim caveat to federal power for Natives who
had become citizens. 304 The language moved in the direction of
federal power, and the further edits by the Grand Committee
moved the dial toward federalizing Native powers over Indian
commerce and trade even more. 305

302 WILLIAM PIERCE’S CHARACTER SKETCHES OF THE DELEGATES TO THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, reprinted in 3 FARRAND, supra note 236, at 87–97.
303 See REPORT ON THE CESSION OF TERRITORY BY THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE, supra
note 171, at 381; REPORT ON THE CESSION OF TERRITORY BY THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE,
supra note 269, at 406; REPORT DETAILING CONDITIONS ON THE CESSION OF TERRITORY
BY THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE, supra note 171, at 559–64.
304 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, ¶ 4.
305 See supra note 285.
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And yet, the Indian Affairs Clause still went missing. Unlike with Madison, the omission of “Indian Affairs” escaped the
Convention’s notice or comment in full Convention. Other than
the mention of Madison’s motion in the sparse official journal
and his own notes on August 18, 306 the Indian Commerce Clause
and its radical departure from the Articles’ provision of power
over both Indian trade and affairs received no attention by
Convention members in any extant records. 307 At most, if noted
by all members of both the Committee of Detail and the final
Grand Committee, 308 only sixteen of the Convention’s fifty-five
members realized the mistake.
Conjuring meaning from such silence is difficult at best,
troublesome at worst. Although it is impossible to know with
certainty, two explanations for partial restoration of Indian
powers seem likely. First, the delegates may have been distracted from the larger issue at hand—the radical power
shrinkage—by the nettlesome federal-state power struggles that
seems to have been solved by Madison’s removal of any states’
rights language. Perhaps in their minds, the worst problem with
the Articles’ treatment of tribes was solved, and in the rush of
the final weeks of the Convention, half begun was well-enough
done. More likely, however, especially for those involved in the
text’s minutia, was a more thoughtful approach. The opening
passages of Randolph’s sketch (containing Rutledge’s “Indian
Affairs” marginal note) contain a guiding philosophy on the importance of textual brevity in constitution writing:
In the draught of a fundamental constitution, two things
deserve attention:
1. To insert essential principles only; lest the operations of government should be clogged by rendering
those provisions permanent and unalterable, which
ought to be accommodated to times and events[.] [A]nd
2. To use simple and precise language, and general
propositions, according to the example of the (several)
constitutions of the several states. (For the construction
See supra note 278.
See generally 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 197–650.
308 There was no overlap on the two committees. The Committee of Detail included
Messrs. Wilson, Gorham, Rutledge, Randolph, and Ellsworth. Madison’s Notes (July 24,
1787), supra note 241, at 106. The final Grand Committee included Messrs. Gilman,
King, Sherman, Brearley, Morris, Dickinson, Carrol, Madison, Williamson, Butler, and
Baldwin. Madison’s Notes (Aug. 31, 1787), supra note 228, at 473.
306
307
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of a constitution necessarrily differs from that of
law)[.] 309
In this first sketch of the Constitution, Randolph had therefore established the Committee of Detail’s guiding lights: to include only essential principles, general propositions, and simple
and precise language. Although the Committee was not always
to follow this principle, 310 it reigned in its August 6 report. Perhaps it also continued to guide in its decision about restoring
“Indian Commerce,” but not “Indian Affairs.” Committee members might have looked at other provisions of the draft
Constitution—including the treaty powers (then lodged in the
Senate) 311 and war powers—and thought such were sufficient to
supply all that was needed for Indian affairs. After all, but for
Natives committing crimes against non-Natives, the Continental
Congress had thus far not directly legislated for Natives, but
treated with them on a tribal level. 312 Under the guiding lights of
Randolph, who himself had been visited by a Cherokee chief
during the Convention, 313 “Indian Affairs” was already embraced
in more general provisions of the Constitution, and was therefore no longer needed.
Additionally, as has been discussed, it is possible that “Indian Commerce” was used as a surrogate for “Indian Trade,”
which committee members knew had garnered a supermajority
of support in Congress. Committee members Gorham and Wilson
had been present in the Confederation Congress in 1786 when national regulation of Indian trade had achieved a supermajority.314
These committee members therefore knew that incorporating
some derivation of “Indian Trade” would likely be uncontroversial. Contrariwise, they would have been all too familiar that the
broader “Affairs” language, embracing competing claims to native
lands, could potentially stir up the controversy then fomenting in
COMMITTEE OF DETAIL DOCUMENT IV, supra note 191, at 137 (alterations omitted).
See, for example, Wilson’s proposed senatorial power to hear interstate disputes.
COMMITTEE OF DETAIL DOCUMENT VIII, reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 159–62.
311 As reported on August 6, the Senate had sole power to enter into treaties. Committee of Detail Report (Aug. 6, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND, supra note 140, at 177,
183. The Senate’s sharing the treaty power with the president was not proposed until
September 4 (after Madison’s proposal of “Indian Affairs” was considered by the Committee of Detail). Madison’s Notes (Sept. 4, 1787), supra note 286, at 498–99.
312 See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
313 LETTER FROM EDMUND RANDOLPH TO BEV. RANDOLPH, LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR
(July 12, 1787), reprinted in 4 CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS AND OTHER
MANUSCRIPTS 315, 315 (William P. Palmer ed., Richmond, R.U. Derr 1884).
314 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
309
310
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the halls of Congress in neighboring New York and threatening
war in Georgia and North Carolina. 315 Whereas federal power
over Indian trade had achieved supermajority status by the time
the Convention sat, the concomitant federal power over Indian
affairs had not.
Yet all of this calculus was at play when the Committee of
Detail first sat. Sometime around July 26, they had agreed to
include “Indian Affairs” in the Constitution. 316 What had
changed? Only time. 317 At this late stage of the Convention, delegates, most especially chairman John Rutledge, were anxious
to return home. 318 Nine of the fifty-five delegates had already
left. 319 By August 18 when Madison made his proposed insertion
of “Indian Affairs” coupled with language intended to solve the
states’ rights issue, the wheels of the Convention were running
efficiently, and controversial matters were postponed or relegated
to committees (as Madison’s was) to keep momentum going. 320
Core provisions, such as selection of the president, were yet to be
worked out. 321 It is very likely that, once its mistake was pointed
out by Madison, the Committee determined that most powers
comprising Indian affairs were essentially already provided to
Congress via broad strokes in the current draft. Leaving the
clause out would sidestep gridlock when the Convention most
required forward progress. Such was also consistent with the
Committee’s guiding light of brevity. Instead, they opted to enshrine the more narrow Articles of Confederation power that
would likely be (and was) noncontroversial: Indian trade via the
Indian Commerce Clause. Half done was left well enough alone.
The Committee of Detail’s failure to restore both Indian
Trade and Affairs proved no expiation for the original sin of
omission. As history has shown, this area of law has led a
See supra notes 155–66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
317 It is possible that those delegates who had attended Congress during the recess
reported back the state of imminent war in Georgia, but such news would have likely
inclined them to include an Indian Affairs Clause rather than leave it out. See supra
note 161 and accompanying text.
318 STEWART, supra note 274, at 178 (“[I]n mid-July, Rutledge had despaired that he
already had been in Philadelphia twice as long as he expected.”).
319 On August 18, 1787, based on recorded delegate arrivals and departures, fortysix members were present. Session 3384, U.S. Constitutional Convention 1787, QUILL
PROJECT AT PEMBROKE COLL., OXFORD (Kieran Hazzard, Lauren Davis, Grace Mallon &
Nicholas Cole eds., 2019 edition), https://perma.cc/9CFL-JVRW.
320 STEWART, supra note 274, at 179.
321 This was done between August 24 and September 7, 1787. Id. at 207–16.
315
316
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torturous existence ever since, likely impacting the lives of millions of Native Americans for the worse. The sum of the parts of
the Constitution has possibly proved greater than the whole
when applied to Indian affairs, in that the power’s lack of discrete textual boundaries has led, inexorably, toward plenary
power. If the Committee of Detail did refrain from restoring
Indian affairs power for the sake of expediency, it was a different kind of mistake which, though less sinister than the ThreeFifths Clause, also compounded itself over time 322 and papered
over what was otherwise an innocent oversight. Yet, as I show,
the omission of the Indian Affairs Clause may actually work to
the tribes’ benefit.
In the end, no one caught the cover-up, 323 and the broader
power of “managing all affairs with the Indians” was forgotten. 324 If delegates did catch the mistake, such conversations
were had apart from the recording pen of history. What began as
a scrivener’s error was only half restored, and preconstitutional
powers shrank.
D. The Ratifiers’ Oversight
The Convention was not alone in its oversight. The missing
clause seems also to have been overlooked by the ratifiers, too.
As already discussed, although Native allies, lands, and trade
were frequent and important topics of state and federal legislative debates, 325 “We the People” as convened in state ratifying
conventions missed the new disparity between governmental
practice and fundamental law (and tribes were omitted from the
discussion altogether). True, as mentioned above, Federalists
were unlikely to criticize the Constitution, especially for having
too few powers. Notwithstanding this, Federalists implicate
the Indian Commerce Clause only twice, both in Federalist
Papers authored by Madison. In Federalist 40, Madison
obliquely mentions the Clause as one of few instances wherein

322 For a discussion of the compounding problem of the Three-Fifths Clause that led to
proslavery Congresses, presidents, and Supreme Courts, see AMAR, supra note 23, at 97–98.
323 No one, that is, except for probably Madison, who had proposed including “Indian
Affairs” and later likely held the quill that tidied up the states’ rights language in the
Committee on Postponed Parts. Although he likely noted the incomplete power respecting Natives, he did nothing further, at least in recorded session, to resolve the deficiency.
324 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, ¶ 4.
325 See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
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the federal government might directly act upon an individual. 326
The other was a lengthier passage in Federalist 42, already
mentioned. 327 There, Madison proclaimed victory because the
Clause eradicated the limitations and confusions of the Articles’
verbiage, and because Congress (not the States) had power to
regulate trade with the Indians. 328 No mention of the awkward
partial restoration is made.
Yet Madison—or any other Federalist, for that matter—was
unlikely to fault the Constitution openly for any reason, let
alone for conferring too few powers on Congress. It was all they
could do to overcome Anti-Federalist concerns without introducing some of their own. Surprisingly, in the following passages,
Madison discusses the congressional power to regulate weights
and measures that is “transferred from the Articles of Confederation,” 329 and likely would have brought to his reader’s attention
that another congressional power from the Articles, Indian affairs, had not been imported from the former document. The silence regarding the power shrinkage is highlighted and reflected
in Federalist 24, where Alexander Hamilton discusses the threat
on western borders posed by “savage tribes” who could join with
European allies in menacing settlers from the East. 330 If Natives
posed a threat of war, by implication, they could also pose the
need for less hostile forms of action, including diplomacy with its
gift giving, coming to agreements regarding disputed lands,
settling of Native-settler disputes, and on and on. Though Hamilton raised the specter of the necessity of noncommercial federal
power to treat with Natives, he declined to address or
acknowledge the problem it posed—perhaps, by implication, prefiguring the liquidation later achieved by Knox to treat tribes as
foreign nations and thus activate the president’s treaty-making
and foreign-relations powers. 331 In this, Hamilton joined Madison
and other Federalists who remained silent regarding the Constitution’s glaring omission.

326 THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 250 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“In some instances, also, those [powers] of the existing government act immediately on
individuals. In cases of capture; of piracy; of the post office; of coins, weights, and
measures; of trade with the Indians. . . .”).
327 Supra note 152 and accompanying text.
328 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 269 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
329 Id.
330 THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
331 Supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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Anti-Federalists, like Federalists, were unlikely to complain
of the Constitution providing too few powers to Congress, and
thus the only mention of the clause by Anti-Federalists was by
Abraham Yates, Jr., discussed above. 332 Without noting that
Indian commerce is quite different and a separate power from
Indian affairs, Yates queries:
If this was the conduct of Congress and their officers, when
possessed of powers which were declared by them to be insufficient for the purposes of government, what have we
reasonably to expect will be their conduct when possessed of
the powers “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes,” when
they are armed with legislative, executive and judicial powers, and their laws the supreme laws of the land[?] 333
It could be argued that Yates was equating commerce with affairs as some scholars are wont to do, 334 but considering his intimacy with this domain of government, that is unlikely. 335
Yates, along with other Federalists and Anti-Federalists, missed
the true significance of the restoration of Indian trade via “Indian
Commerce” but not “Indian Affairs.”
***
In all, several factors demonstrate that leaving out Indian
affairs as a distinct congressional power was a mistake turned
intentional omission: the long preconstitutional history of Indian
affairs as a distinct area of law from Indian trade and a choate
federal structure, the Convention’s directive to include the Articles’
legislative powers, the presence of two draft texts including
“Indian Affairs,” the missed insertion of the clause by Randolph
and later Wilson, the partial restoration by committees on the
eve of the Convention, and the lack of general debate on the federal or state convention floors. The error was first Randolph’s,
then Wilson’s, then the Committee of Detail’s twice—the first
time innocently, the second, intentionally—and was then passed
over by the Constitutional Convention and the ratifying conventions. When Madison caught the mistake, the Committee of
Supra note 159 and accompanying text.
Sydney, supra note 159, at 1158.
334 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 23, at 107–08.
335 It is more probable he anticipated the more holistic view of the Constitution
adopted by President Washington. See Ablavsky, supra note 21, at 1041.
332
333
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Detail addressed the lapse and determined to provide a partial
restoration of one of the two Indian powers, and no one thereafter commented on the lapse. The Constitution is thus missing an
Indian Affairs Clause.
III. SIGNIFICANCE AND THE FIX
A constitutional omission of this magnitude is novel. It thus
raises a myriad of unprecedented and pressing questions: What
does the omission of an Indian Affairs Clause mean for Congress’s
tribal plenary power, for tribal sovereignty, and for the meaning
of the Commerce Clause as a whole? How does it impact statetribal relationships? What are the implications for the scope of
the treaty power? These and other important questions will not
be addressed here but will provide the basis for further fruitful
research and scholarship. Instead, this Article concludes by discussing the significance of omitting an Indian affairs power for
congressional plenary power over tribes and suggesting a practical fix to the constitutional power gap: reinitiating tribal treatymaking.
A.

Significance for Plenary Power

This history demonstrates that the Constitution as finalized—without an Indian Affairs Clause—was almost assuredly
intentional. This has major significance for congressional plenary
power. Without an Indian affairs power, plenary power is constitutionally wanting and fails. In addressing the significance of
the missing Indian Affairs Clause, this Section first deals with
the issue of intent, differentiating between intent on a high level
of generality versus its more fine-grained variants. Second, it
proposes that omission of the Indian Affairs Clause split the
preconstitutional Indian affairs powers between the executive
and Congress, leaving the residue to the sovereign tribes and
operating as a limit if not a bar on congressional plenary power
over tribes.
1. The universality of broad intent.
Currently, all theories of constitutional or statutory interpretation assume that what is included and omitted in a text are
results of intentional drafting processes in the broad sense. Mistakes inhere the lack of intent, and herein lies a problem: most
constitutional theorists, including originalists, disfavor intent.
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Determining the mind and will of one individual at any given
point in time is difficult. Adding the dimension of time and the
complexity of a multimember drafting process (not to mention
multiple multimember bodies) and determining collective intent approaches the impossible. As Professor Paul Brest said in
his seminal article The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding:
[A]n intention can only become binding—only become an institutional intention—when it is shared by at least the same
number and distribution of adopters. . . .
If the only way a judge could ascertain institutional intent
were to count individual intention-votes, her task would be
impossible even with respect to a single multimember lawmaking body, and a fortiori where the assent of several such
bodies were required. 336
Intentionalism, Brest posits, is thus “problematic” when narrowly
applied. 337
However, central to the concept of law, especially fundamental law, is intent on a very high level of abstraction: the law
was meant to be law, and interpreters assume intent for what is
included and excluded in a text. 338 Coherence and thinking are
necessary predicates to legal text. It is not poetry or history or
soliloquy, but law because it was meant to be law. This kind of
intent—that it is an intentional law—does not pertain to or partake of individual thought processes per se, but it requires that
any thought process or coherence preceded the text. The centrality of broad intentionalism is underscored by the persistent
presence of interpretive canons of construction. 339

336 Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 214 (1980); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 31–37 (1997) (criticizing use of legislative history as an interpretive
tool); RAKOVE, supra note 292, at 6–7 (arguing that trying to understand the “true intentions” of the Framers can introduce problems of “bias, perspective, and [ ] intelligibility”).
337 Brest, supra note 336, at 220.
338 This canon is referred to as expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning that
expression of one is exclusion of another. SCALIA, supra note 336, at 25; see also WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 638 (2012).
339 See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 730 (2014) (criticizing the sticking force of “the menagerie
of canons currently beloved by interpreters of all stripes”).

478

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:413

Thus broad intent is assumed for law, especially constitutional law. Yet what if this generalized intent is missing? What
if the law was incoherent, or unintentional? What if what was
meant to be law was left out not by virtue of this generalized intent, but because of its lack? Such a mistake is a particular form
of lack of intent that is different in kind from evidence of little or
no discussion, rejection of a proposal, or some other form of negative intention. It is closer to the species of unintended consequences of otherwise intentional texts, 340 but differs still in that
there are unintended consequences of unintentional texts, similar to scriveners’ errors. Had Madison not caught the Committee
of Detail’s mistake, new theory of this ken would be required to
supplement the missing Clause, including any analogies to the
mistake doctrine for a possible sub silentio judicial fix.
Yet this is not the case here. As has been shown, there was
intention—of the broad variety—in the determination to omit
the Indian Affairs Clause. Even if the doctrine were to apply, recent case law demonstrates that Madison’s flagging of the omission would prevent application of the mistake doctrine. 341 Thus
intent is relevant, as is the lack thereof. Meaning can appropriately be derived from the intentional omission of the Indian
Affairs Clause without implicating the same theoretical concerns as intent on a more finite level. 342
340 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (citation omitted):

[E]ven if one accepts that legislative history has some value—and we do—it
does not follow that the original meaning of a clause or text is defined by the
Framers’ original expected applications. We contend that it is not, because
original expected applications are not enacted by the text, and legislators are
often unaware of the implications of laws they enact.
341 At least one Supreme Court statutory interpretation case is directly on point. In
Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004), text from the Bankruptcy Code allowing a
debtor’s attorneys to collect fees was deleted in an amended version of the law. Id. at
530. The National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys raised the deletion in
two sentences of a 472-page report submitted to the relevant House subcommittee. Id. at
541–42. The Court found that “[t]his alert, followed by the Legislature’s nonresponse,
should support a presumption of legislative awareness and intention.” Id. at 541. Although
the Court later indicated that the alert “cannot bear too much weight” as Congress did
not attend to it in their deliberations, they nonetheless chose not to smooth over the unintentional omissions and barred debtors’ attorneys from a fee award. Id. at 541–42.
Thus, even if the Court were to apply the same analysis to the unintentional omission of
the Indian Affairs Clause, to which Madison alerted the inattentive Convention, it is unlikely they would deign to correct the Committee of Detail’s error.
342 In circumventing these discussions, this Article does not delve into Founding-era
intent, original expectations, or original public meaning to any extent, even though
analyses of that kind would likely support the analysis here. Assuming that Indian affairs
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2. Splitting the Indian affairs power.
Assuming that the Indian Affairs Clause was intentionally
omitted and that such broad intent permits constitutional meaning, where did the preconstitutional Indian affairs power go? It
must yield to the Constitution’s other enumerated powers and
external Indian affairs powers are therefore split between the
executive and the legislature, with the residue of internal affairs
powers reverting to the sovereign tribes.
The Indian affairs powers held by the president are limited
to the treaty power and, by analogy, the historical gloss of the
president’s international relations powers. 343 Under Article II,
§ 2, the treaty power is shared with “the Advice and Consent of
the Senate . . . provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” 344 Although this could ostensibly have been liquidated in
different fashion by early practice, this clause has come to mean
that the president must gain consent of the Senate through ratification. 345 Consent may be conditional and require implementing legislation, 346 but, until the late nineteenth century, tribal
treaties were considered self-executing without such. 347 Under a
strict interpretation of the treaty power, if treaties require implementing legislation, such legislation would postdate the
treaty. 348
As far as the executive’s international relations powers,
there remains the possibility that the president may deal with
tribes via sole executive agreement or congressional-executive
agreements, rather than treaties. Historically, the president
has entered into sole executive agreements only where he has

could be read into the Constitution as a mistaken omission and that intent could appropriately be discussed on a finite level, plenary power would still fail, as it is inconceivable that the Framers intended Congress to legislate for individual tribal members as it
does today, barring plenary power in any event. Without delving into intent, the arguments made here are in harmony with original public meaning on a textual level.
343 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).
344 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
345 Stephen P. Mulligan, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S.
Law, CONGRESSIONAL RSCH. SERV. 4 (Sept. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/ZEM8-ABAC.
346 Id.
347 Blackhawk, supra note 26, at 1811.
348 The first Trade and Intercourse Act may be interpreted loosely as ratification of
the preconstitutional Hopewell Treaties, but later renditions of the Act and their additions were increasing departures from whatever textual conformance there initially may
have been. Supra notes 134, 137 and accompanying text.
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concurrent statutory or constitutional power. 349 In the tribal
context, assuming congressional plenary power is unfounded,
the statutory power authorizing sole executive agreements must
relate to one of Congress’s enumerated powers vis-à-vis tribes—
spending, war, property, or commerce powers. 350 The president
could also feasibly enter into a sole executive agreement with
tribes where he has concurrent and independent constitutional
power as the commander in chief or via the historical ability of
the president to resolve private international claims 351 or, in
the tribal context, hear Native claims brought in the Court of
Federal Claims. 352 Although there has been a rise in nontreaty
congressional-executive agreements in recent years, 353 applying
such to tribes would prove problematic: as history has shown,
this is an area of law where colonialism’s shelf life has yet to expire, and, given the power disparity vis-à-vis tribes and federal
organs, the use of executive-congressional agreements would invariably prove an exception that would swallow the constitutional rule, proving yet another detriment to long-suffering
tribal sovereignty. Instead, this is an area of law that would
benefit from the application of clear constitutional rules: unless
the president acts under his limited statutory or constitutional
powers in executing sole executive agreements, or Congress exercises concurrent power under the War, Spending, Property, or
Commerce Clauses in executing congressional-executive agreements, treaties should be the exclusive means of sovereign-tosovereign negotiation.
In a similar vein, without an Indian Affairs Clause, Congress’s
power over external tribal affairs is limited by those powers
touching Native Nations referenced above—via the War,
Spending, Property, or Commerce Clauses, and all things necessary and proper thereto. 354 In this, there is an apt analogy in the
349 Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV.
1573, 1581–84 (2007).
350 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
351 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
352 See Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-726, § 12, 60 Stat. 1049,
1052. The Commission was terminated and all such claims were transferred to the Court of
Federal Claims, see generally Act of July 20, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-69, 91 Stat. 273, but Natives’ claims against the Federal Government can now be heard in any federal court.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.06[3] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2017)
[hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
353 Clark, supra note 349, at 1584–91.
354 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
421 (1819).
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immigration-law context, wherein the Supreme Court has begun
chipping away at Congress’s once-exceptional plenary power over
immigration by applying the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses and the naturalization and other powers. 355
The residue of Indian affairs power as to internal relations
reverts to the sovereign tribes. Natives were excluded procedurally and textually from the Constitution. Tribal members, considered noncitizens at the time, did not take part in ratification, 356 and thus did not bind themselves under the Constitution
as states and the people did by participating in and submitting
to it. The Constitution also made explicit reference to excluding
“Indians not taxed” in the Apportionment Clause. 357 Although
this arrangement was later altered in 1924 when U.S. citizenship was granted to all Indians born in the United States, 358 this
did not alter the fact that tribal governments were not parties to
the Constitution. If popular sovereignty as enshrined in the concept of “We the People” means anything, it requires that “just
powers” derive “from the consent of the governed.” 359 Thus, by
not yielding any powers to the federal (or state) governments by
participating in the Constitution’s process, tribes retained their
powers and sovereignty over internal affairs.
This conclusion departs sharply from that of Justice Thomas
in Lara and Natelson in his scholarship, 360 who assume that if
Congress is without plenary power, the residue is reserved to
the states under the Tenth Amendment. 361 Yet the Tenth
Amendment does not reserve all “powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution” to the “States respectively, or
to the people”; only those not also “prohibited by [the Constitution] to the States.” 362 Here, there is a limit. The doctrine of popular sovereignty enshrined in the Constitution’s essential structure
355 See David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 596–98 (2017). See generally, e.g., Sessions v. MoralesSantana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017); Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86 (2015); Arizona v. United
States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
356 See generally PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE
CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788 (2010) (making no mention of Native Americans playing any
part in the ratification contest).
357 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
358 See generally Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 253;
COHEN, supra note 352, at § 14.01[1].
359 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 2 (U.S. 1776).
360 Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
361 See supra note 18; U.S. CONST. amend. X.
362 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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as articulated above is also preserved in the background principles of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments themselves: undelegated powers are reserved, and unenumerated rights are retained by those who decline to yield them, 363 and the tribes
yielded nothing except as specified by treaties to which they
were willing parties. Thus these amendments do not magically
operate as springing rights à la property law for the states with
respect to tribes that have otherwise retained their powers. Instead, they preserve tribal sovereignty and limit state power.
Additionally, once Indians also became U.S. citizens, the final
phrase of the Tenth Amendment applied, in that they became
“people” (rather than states) to whom such unenumerated powers were reserved, and possibly even before citizenship was recognized. Internal Indian affairs powers thus reverted to the
tribes.
The end result of the above is that the intentional omission
of the Indian Affairs Clause split the preconstitutional power between Executive and Legislative Branches, returning the residue to the sovereign tribes. Splitting the baby in this manner
acts either as a limit or a complete bar to congressional plenary
power over tribes.
B.

The Fix: Re-treating with Tribes

With Congress’s Indian affairs powers limited to war,
spending, territory, and commerce powers, and the executive’s
treaty power preempted by the 1871 absolution statute, the federal government is left without any effective means of managing
Indian affairs. Rescinding the 1871 statute and reinitiating
tribal treaty-making as started by the Washington administration and continued for nearly a century thereafter provides a
way forward. This approach, so long as any implementing legislation antedates tribal treaties, is consistent with the text and
history of the Constitution as outlined above. Further, it is also
supported by the Constitution’s structure and precedent, as well
as many timely prudential arguments.
Re-treating with tribes restores the careful checks and balances set forth in the Constitution’s structure, requiring consent
of two-thirds of the members present in the Senate.
Although reinstituting tribal treaty-making would unpick a
hundred and fifty years of statutory precedent, the 1871 statutory
363

U.S. CONST. amends. IX–X.
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policy was on shaky constitutional footing from inception. In siding with Justice Thomas, Professor Alexander Pearl insists that
the 1871 act is unconstitutional because Congress does not have
the power “to decide which groups are, or are not, sovereign
enough to engage in treaty-making with the United States.” 364
Further, the act revoked a constitutional executive power for a
certain class of treaty makers. Though there is arguably constitutional space for all three branches to interpret the Constitution
vis-à-vis their own remits, the 1871 act is a far cry further: it involved one branch enforcing their interpretation of the Constitution as against another, generally thought to be the province of
the judiciary. 365 Revoking the statute and reinstituting executive
treaty-making with Natives, especially that which anticipates
legislation, would moot the constitutional questionability of the
act and reintroduce a balance and separation of powers among
the three branches in this beleaguered area of law.
Re-treating with tribes is also consistent with several trends
in Native American law. The first trend finds its origins in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 366 wherein Chief Justice Marshall
recognized tribes as “domestic dependent nations.” 367 Though
questioned at times, tribal sovereignty has never since been disannulled, and has been reaffirmed by the Lara Court and recent
administrations. 368 Too, since the Indian Reorganization Act in
1934, 369 and especially since 1961, federal administrations have
adopted a policy of self-determination and self-governance for
tribes. 370 Treating with tribes recognizes their inherent sovereignty and allows them to self-determine. Additionally, there is
a canon of construction for all sources of applicable Native
Pearl, supra note 21, at 331.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1804) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of [this Court] to say what the law is.”).
366 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
367 Id. at 17.
368 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 199; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Indian Policy, RONALD
REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM (Jan. 24, 1983), https://perma.cc/F87B-HYJX (referring to “sovereign Indian nations” and the “right of each tribe to set its own priorities and
goals”); User Clip: George W. Bush on Tribal Sovereignty, C-SPAN (2004),
https://perma.cc/36J6-G4VR (recognizing tribes as sovereign); Nick Smith, President Obama
Visits Standing Rock, BISMARK TRIB. (June 13, 2014), https://perma.cc/Q9VY-VLAW (quoting President Obama as saying, “throughout history, the United States often didn’t give
the nation-to-nation relationship the respect that it deserved . . . [s]o I promised that
when I ran to be a president who’d change that—a president who honors our sacred
trust, and who respects your sovereignty”).
369 Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
370 COHEN, supra note 352, at § 1.07.
364
365
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American law requiring that they be interpreted in the light
most favorable for tribes.371 Applying this canon to the Constitution
writ large and interpreting it in a light most favorable to the
tribes requires re-treating with tribes.
The importance of re-treating with tribes is also underscored by three reasons sounding in constitutional ethics. Recently, in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 372 Herrera v. Wyoming, 373 and
Nebraska v. Parker, 374 the Court has emphasized the imperative
to maintain historic agreements with tribes. The KnoxWashington congressional pact and the tribal treaty-making
that endured for nearly a century thereafter represents a kind of
founding compact or constitution with tribes. It was the manner
in which White society interacted with them, liquidating the
meaning of the Constitution, sans an Indian Affairs Clause. In
conformance with the McGirt line of recent precedents, the
United States is obligated to keep its historic agreements with
tribes, including its original course-of-dealing compact with
tribes to treat with them as sovereign nations. Further, the 1871
appropriations rider disannulling the president’s ability to treat
with tribes is a vestige of the era’s colonialism, coming as it did
during the federal government’s paternalistic policy of allotment
and assimilation between 1871 and 1928 when the federal government sought to do away with tribal governments altogether
and Indians were made to assimilate into White society, with
devastating effects. 375 This was a low moment in our history, one
we would do well to rectify. The final ethical reason follows from
the last: this is a moment of great societal disruption when
Americans are called upon to think more deeply about those excluded from the constitutional process, whether because of skin
color, national origin, or gender. Overturning 150 years of precedent is no small thing. Yet the time may be ripe to do just that
and reverse a century and a half of paternalistic colonialism and
eradicate a blight on collective constitutional consciousness. Doing so would provide Native American law its Brown v. Board of
Education 376 moment and allow the vestiges of colonialism to be

371
372
373
374
375
376

Id. at § 2.02[1]–[2].
140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (upholding historical treaties with the Creek Nation).
139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019) (upholding a treaty with the Crow Tribe).
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thrown off entirely, providing cause for celebration in these dark
times.
In conclusion, restoring treaty-making would elevate tribes
to a more coequal status with those on the other side of the negotiating table (or circle, as it were), and restores languishing
tribal sovereignty. As Pearl writes:
With a treaty, there is less discretion, less uncertainty, and
less variability, from which all parties benefit. Revitalizing
the constitutionally created right of the Executive to enter
into treaties with Indian tribes simplifies the Federal-Tribal
relationship while also adhering to fundamental principles
of constitutional design and restoring order to separation of
power principles. 377
Treating with Native Tribes again as the Washington administration did celebrates and resolidifies tribal sovereignty—a
crown jewel in the constitutional canon 378—and is consistent
with the Constitution’s text, history, and structure, and precedent, as well as constitutional ethics.
CONCLUSION
Indian affairs was initially intended for constitutional inclusion. As a long-held power of the British and the Confederation,
the Constitutional Convention unanimously mandated the incorporation of Indian affairs with other congressional powers
under the Articles of Confederation, and John Rutledge, acting
as Committee of Detail chair and likely by their consensus if not
vote, directed James Wilson to include it in the Committee’s
reported draft. Duty bound and personally motivated to defend
his own Native-acquired land through federal channels, James
Wilson clearly meant to include the clause and even checked it
off as if he had. And yet, it appears nowhere in his final draft of
the Constitution, perhaps because it was lost along with the
missing portion of Wilson’s first full draft. The Committee
missed Wilson’s mistake, and reported their draft out of Committee without any mention of Indians—commerce, affairs, or
otherwise. Madison caught the mistake, but his proposal was
tabled and only discussed back in the Committee of Detail,
which restored only the power over Indian trade. The Committee
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inserted “Indians” into the Commerce Clause but failed to restore power over Indian affairs, this time intentionally. This
change was adopted by the Convention and sent to the states as
part of the Constitution for ratification, where the omission was
overlooked. The Constitution is thus missing an Indian Affairs
Clause.
Although over two centuries of confusion have ensued, the
missing clause might redound to the benefit of the tribes. Such
an omission is novel in constitutional theory and raises new and
important questions that implicate theoretical creativity and
experimentation. The omission of the clause was intentional,
broadly speaking, and therefore meaningful: without an Indian
Affairs Clause, constitutional authority for congressional plenary power collapses. The preconstitutional external Indian affairs
power is therefore split between the executive and Congress via
their respective enumerated powers touching tribes under the
Constitution, with the residual internal affairs powers reverting
to the tribes. The limit on Indian affairs power requires the resuscitation of tribal treaty-making, which will restore constitutional separation of powers, continue recent legal trends toward
self-determination, overturn a hundred and fifty years of colonialism, and capture the present moment of creative disruption in
racial relations by bequeathing to the tribes their own Brown v.
Board of Education crowning achievement for tribal sovereignty.

